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With the advent of the civil rights movement in America 
in the 1960's, equality of education for all students has 
been in the forefront of judicial decisions. With the 
passage of numerous public laws, Congress has provided defi­
nitions of the rights of individuals with disabilities and 
guarantees of due process. However, by not clearly defining 
these rights, Congress left clarification to the courts and 
created problems for educators and administrators. 
The procedure used in this study involved analysis of 
judicial decisions, case law and federal and selected state 
statutes. Primary sources were state and federal court 
decisions involving exceptional children and children with 
disabilities. Students attended either elementary or sec­
ondary public schools; no cases involving private schools 
were included. No cases involving public or private commu­
nity college, college or university students were reviewed. 
Based on this analysis, the following conclusions were 
drawn: 
(1) Parents must be given a copy of the due process 
procedures and have these rights explained. 
(2) The Individual Education Program (IEP) must be 
developed appropriately with full parental partic­
ipation and a student must receive some education­
al benefits from the services. 
If an IEP is inappropriate or not implemented 
correctly, a free appropriate public education 
(FAPE) has not been provided. 
A student must be educated in the least restric­
tive environment (LRE) where appropriate. 
Parents must exhaust all administrative remedies 
before they take legal action. 
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
(IDEA) is the exclusive avenue for legal action 
involving FAPE for a child with disabilities. 
If there is any pending due process procedure, a 
student's placement can not be changed. 
Courts have not ruled on different methods of edu 
cation, leaving educational methods to the profes 
sionals. 
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Preface 
The topic of this dissertation is very important to me 
because I am a middle-aged adult with a learning disability. 
All three of my natural children are identified as excep­
tional. All four of my step-children are exceptional on one 
end of the scale or the other and three of my seven step-
grandchildren are classified as exceptional. Yet, my dis­
ability wasn't diagnosed until I was 38 years old and it was 
an accident at that. 
Few knew what a learning disability (LD) was when I 
entered kindergarten in 1951. In addition to being LD, I am 
severely red-green colorblind. Needless to say, the primary 
curriculum of the day was a horror for me. Reading was an 
exercise in futility and frustration. Frankly, I despised 
reading and that stupid "bluebird" reading group. Everyone 
knew that the "bluebirds" were "slow" or "just plain 
stupid." This was the beginning of a life-long hidden 
stigma. It was also the beginning of the art of deception 
at which I became very adept! "What's the matter? Can't 
you ..." struck cold fear in my heart because I usually 
couldn't do whatever they were asking about. So I learned 
to hide how dumb I felt I was. 
I would have done anything in the world to get out of 
that "bluebird" group. So, I memorized the pictures on each 
page of the "Dick, Sally, Jane and Spot" books. I could 
"read" every word on the page if I could see the pictures! 
But the words didn't make any sense. I finally got out of 
the "bluebirds," but now I had another set of books to learn 
to "read." No one found out I couldn't read that year or 
the next. But I didn't like myself very much because I was 
lying to everyone, including my parents. I didn't want to 
be stupid or a "retard" as the slow children were called. I 
just wanted to fit in like any "normal" kid. My father used 
to say that I was like a chameleon and blended in anywhere. 
Spelling wasn't much better. Phonics made absolutely 
no sense because I could not distinguish the different 
sounds. The sounds made no sense to me. I could memorize a 
word long enough to make 100 on the spelling test, but don't 
ask me to spell it the next week. The review lessons were 
an absolute horror because I would have to learn each word 
all over again; I just couldn't memorize all those words 
again. Much later, my mother would ask me if I couldn't 
hear the sounds the letters make; the words sing. No, I 
couldn't. My reaction to my mother was something like "I 
can't hear the sounds." I guess that I am "tone deaf" when 
it comes to phonics. 
Math on the other hand was my forte, but girls weren't 
supposed to be very good at math. So I got no encouragement 
from my teachers to pursue it. Yet, my parents believed in 
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me and encouraged my interest in mathematics. By the fifth 
grade, my father had taught me to use a slide rule to do all 
my multiplication problems and was explaining interpolation 
to me. I was so proud that I could actually do something 
the other students couldn't that I took my slide rule to 
class. I could even do logarithms and understood them. So 
what was my teacher's reaction? She sent me to the princi­
pal for cheating on ray homework. When my father arrived at 
school, he and the principal decided that it would be best 
if I kept my slide rule at home. I could use it in junior 
high school. My math grades began to suffer when "word 
problems" became more complicated. I could work any of them 
if I could read them, but I couldn't always read them. 
My father tried to make me feel better once just after 
report cards came out. He sat me down and told me that "You 
aren't quite as smart as your brothers and sisters. Things 
take you a little longer, but you can do anything you want 
to do if you just put your mind to it." I know in my heart 
that my father was trying to help me, but I translated what 
he said to mean I was not very intelligent. I have seven 
siblings and I was convinced that I was the "dummy" in the 
family. 
Teachers don't seem to realize the impact they have on 
their young students. I still remember comments made to me 
by my elementary school teachers. I have more than once 
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wanted to find three particular teachers and tell them what 
dispiriting repercussions their insensitive, careless re­
marks had on my life. Their impact was very negative and 
harmful in my case. I suffered from a subterranean self-
image until I was almost 40 years old. 
Forty years ago, my third-grade teacher, whose name I 
still can't spell, told me that I could be a good student if 
I just tried a little harder -- after I had spent hours and 
hours working on a math project researching mathematicians 
and what they had contributed to math. She said my spelling 
was atrocious and my handwriting worse. My mother had 
corrected my rough draft, but I couldn't get it from the 
rough draft to the finished paper. I just couldn't copy it 
correctly; I transposed letters, left out words and punctua­
tion marks. I couldn't try any harder. I didn't know how 
to try any harder. I was already giving 150 percent. Did 
other kids work this hard? I didn't think so. My brothers 
and sisters didn't spend as much time on their homework as I 
did and their grades were much better. I had to be weird or 
maybe I really was retarded. 
I finally did learn to read, but not the way other 
children learned. To read, I had to memorize each and every 
word, how each looked and what the shape of each word was. 
I would know a word one day and not the next. If I can get 
a word into my long-term memory, I usually have it for life 
(not that I can spell it). I just have to figure out dif­
ferent ways to accomplish this. I am an extremely slow 
reader, but I only have to read something once. I average 
95-98% retention over time. 
One educator in my life jerked me up short and out of 
the "retarded" mind set. She was a guidance counselor in my 
high school. She called me in to discuss my first six 
week's grades in my sophomore year, my first year at the 
high school. I politely explained to her that I was frankly 
doing the best that I could, but what did she expect anyway 
because I wasn't very bright. Her reaction changed my life. 
She said "I wish half of the students in this school were 
that 'retarded'." She went on to explain that my I.Q. was 
in the top one percent of students my age and there was 
obviously something else causing me problems. She never 
told me what my I.Q. was and I probably wouldn't have under­
stood the significance at that stage of my life. I actually 
didn't want to know what it was anyway. All I truly needed 
to know was that she believed in me and she was an educator 
who was supposed to know everything. I honestly didn't 
believe her or what she said about how bright I was. But I 
did want to believe that there was hope and maybe, just 
maybe, I wasn't stupid or retarded after all. 
I began to look at who I was and how I did learn 
things. I began to analyze when I could study the best. I 
found that it was when it was quiet so I'd go to bed very 
early and get up at 1:30 in the morning and study until it 
was time to go to school. I would also walk to school so I 
could drink my coffee on the way, which helped to settle me 
down (caffeine always is good for the hyperactive), and go 
over my homework in my head. 
Everyone with a disability learns to cope somehow - I 
used my mouth. Also, I was a lucky guesser on standardized 
tests. I became a very verbal person--I certainly couldn't 
write. If I had a choice to do a written report or an oral 
presentation in front of the class, I'd pick the presenta­
tion every time. I became a very adept story teller. I 
never read to my students in all the years I taught school. 
I would paraphrase or summarize oz* memorize, but I never 
read to them. And they loved it. 
I am an excellent resource teacher. I can recognize my 
problems in others and teach them the way I have to learn. 
Guess what? It works! I have walked a ffiile in their shoes 
and understand all of the different problems and feelings 
they are facing. I still have former students write or call 
me for help and I haven't taught in the public schools for 
over 12 years. 
The other motivating reason to select this topic for my 
dissertation is because I have a second and third generation 
of children with disabilities going through the public 
school system. The struggle has gotten somewhat better and 
a little easier. Now there are laws to protect and provide 
for these children. But the human nature hasn't changed 
that much. Most teachers react from lack of knowledge or 
inexperience. 
My son, Craig, who is now 22 years old, was one of the 
reasons I went back to school to work on a Masters degree in 
special education. From the time he was very little it was 
apparent to me that he had some major difficulties that 
would cause him problems in school. Craig talked to himself 
all the time. His attention span was very short. He was 
busy and active all the time with a variety of things. He 
loved music. 
When Craig entered kindergarten, his teacher said he 
was "very bright," but by the end of the first grade, this 
opinion was beginning to change. Craig was having trouble 
with writing and learning to read. His printing was illegi­
ble at best. 
The second grade was a continuation of the downhill 
slide for Craig. He was caught "cheating" in reading cir­
cle. He was trying to see the teacher's manual that was on 
her lap to get the correct answer because he couldn't read 
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the question. I couldn't get the other "professionals" to 
see that he had a problem. (I still hadn't been diagnosed 
as having a learning disability.) Craig was tested by the 
school contract psychologist at the end of the second grade. 
I was told by that psychologist that I was looking for 
skeletons in the closet because I taught L.D. children and I 
should just accept the fact that he wouldn't do very well in 
school because not every child is an Einstein. Does this 
sound familiar? Remember, this second trip through the 
public school system began in 1978 when Craig was six-years-
old. As far as I was concerned, not a lot of progress had 
been made in the field of education in 27 years and I was an 
educator. I frankly refused to accept this diagnosis of the 
child or of the situation. This sounded too familiar. 
Craig had repeated the third grade and made some 
progress that year. He changed schools and school systems 
in the fourth grade. We paid tuition for him to attend 
another public school out of our district that had a much 
better program for students having difficulty and for excep­
tional children. By the time Craig was ten, he was dramati­
cally losing ground at school and in the self-esteem depart­
ment. He still hadn't been identified as having any prob­
lems other than some disruptive behavior in the classroom. 
We worked every night on the same material the teacher had 
covered that day to keep Craig at least even in school. He 
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could remember anything he heard so I re-read his assign­
ments to him. He could answer the questions in class, but 
had trouble taking the tests. When I told him he was a very 
smart person, he would reply "You have to say that because 
you are my mother, but I'm really a dummy or I could do this 
work!" It was time to have an independent evaluation done. 
This time I had him evaluated by a private psychologist, one 
I had worked with professionally. Now I had some positive 
input into the evaluation of my son. I wasn't disregarded 
as an over-reacting parent with a "little" knowledge, but 
treated as a concerned parent and a professional. 
The test results were as I had expected, but because of 
Craig's high I.Q. it was difficult to determine exactly what 
his problem was. Several tests that the school system 
didn't routinely give or give at all had to be administered. 
Finally a more complete picture began to emerge. Craig did 
have a learning disability and the discrepancy between his 
potential and his actual scholastic achievement levels was 
increasing at an alarming rate. He was literally drowning 
at school. Something had to be done quickly or he would be 
labeled incorrectly, if at all and lost in the educational 
maze ! 
In the meantime, we requested that Craig attend a 
different school within that school system because it was 
closer to our home. This request was granted. When I took 
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the private evaluation results to the new school-based 
committee, Craig was immediately placed in a resource pro­
gram for LD students. He was now in the fifth grade. Craig 
had a long way to go to learn to deal with his disability. 
At this same time, because of a series of accidents, I 
found out for sure what I had long suspected, that I also 
have a learning disability. I had recently earned a MA in 
special education majoring in the Gifted/Talented area 
specializing in math and science. I had quit teaching in 
the public schools for a multitude of reasons, including 
being verbally reprimanded by a soon-to-retire principal for 
my unorthodox teaching methods even though the results were 
extraordinary, positive, and lasting, and being unable to 
fight for my child and teach in a school system at the same 
time. A friend of mine was working on her MA in psychology 
and needed to give the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
(WAIS) to someone in my age group. She kept after me for 
several days until I finally acquiesced, but only with the 
conditions that no one else except her professor was to see 
the results and I was to get a copy of the "report" no 
matter what it said. I was frankly afraid that the test 
would prove that I was a chronic over-achiever and not as 
bright as the rest of the world finally perceived me or as I 
hoped I was. 
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When the testing was finished and scored and the report 
written, she showed me the profile on the front of the WAIS. 
I was shocked. I immediately got out a copy of Craig's 
current profile. They were almost carbon copies. Where I 
scored exceedingly high, so did he. My weaknesses were also 
his. The fact that these test results proved what I had 
suspected for a very long time lifted a big weight off my 
shoulders! I really was a smart person with worth and 
value. I wasn't retarded or lazy, I just learned different­
ly and at a different rate. This was the first time, in my 
mind and soul, that it was O.K. to be me! 
Even with all the support at home, Craig was still 
suffering from these same feelings. By the eleventh grade, 
Craig had had enough of school, of teachers who didn't 
understand or seem to care, and of the system in general. 
He was never considered for academically gifted classes 
because of his grades (and behavior by now) even though his 
I.Q. was far above that necessary to be placed. He wouldn't 
get resource help because of the stigma that was attached to 
"the dummy" hall and he was becoming a definite discipline 
problem at school. He had quit school once, but I convinced 
him to return with some modification being made in the 
regular classroom program. 
It wasn't until Craig was 17 years old that his "real" 
disability was discovered! Craig is almost completely an 
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auditory processor. The written word is very difficult if 
not impossible for him to comprehend. He can read most 
things, but he must hear the information to retain it. For 
this reason, he qualifies for recordings for the blind. 
This helped him considerably. But a lot of the psychologi­
cal damage had already been done. 
Craig's dejection, misery, and anger with public educa­
tion are apparent in a research paper he wrote in tenth 
grade. The following quote is from that paper, titled "A 
Lesson in Life: The Gifted/LD Student (May, 1989)." 
The word "frustration" has been in my vocabulary 
since my first reading circle! ... I will never "out­
grow" my disability, but I will try to overcome it. My 
self-image is so poor in certain areas I would rather 
take a zero than get up in front of a class to give a 
speech or read a passage from a book. Until recently I 
have failed so many times before, even when I put forth 
my maximum effort. . . . 
From doing this research, I have found a lot of 
people, including teachers, do not know or understand 
the gifted/LD student. I have gained a different 
insight into myself as a person. I feel much better 
about my abilities and potential to achieve. I also 
understand in greater detail how to contend with my 
disability. I do have talents and I am not an idiot. 
I am not the "brightest, laziest" student my teachers 
ever had because I can't (or as they say won't) learn 
to spell their vocabulary words. [This statement is a 
direct quote from one of Craig's high school teach­
ers.]. . . gifted LD students are just as capable if 
not better equipped to cope with the stress of life 
after school. If a LD student can learn to cope and 
eventually overcome his problem, he has learned the 
necessary skills to survive in a "real life" situation. 
. . .Most people never scratch the surface of their 
potential ability and go through life without ever 
discovering their talents or themselves. While I have 
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not fully discovered myself, I have a new purpose in 
life. Two sayings I have heard often are "A wise 
person will make more opportunities than he finds." and 
"Luck is when opportunity meets preparationI think 
these sayings best describe the gifted/LD student. If 
he survives high school, he can survive anything. 
Craig quit high school at the beginning of the second 
semester in eleventh grade. I didn't oppose him at all. We 
were both tired of the battle with public education. He was 
given permission by the superintendent of schools to enter 
an adult high school diploma program. He completed all of 
the tests to graduate from high school with excellent scores 
in only two days. All of the tests were given orally. He 
entered a community college immediately. I can't say it has 
all been smooth sailing at this level because it hasn't. 
Yet Craig found out that he could do the academic work with 
some modifications made for his disability. In fact, his 
last semester GPA was 3.5. He has taken a break from col­
lege, but not out of frustration this time. He just doesn't 
know what he really wants to major in or do with his life. 
Now he is working and learning exactly what he is capable of 
accomplishing. He will return to college in the near future 
when he finds the career that he wants to pursue. I have no 
doubts that Craig will make it. 
My job is not over because I have two more children at 
home and both are classified as exceptional. Granted my 
xx 
daughter, Danna, is in the academically gifted curriculum at 
the high school, but there are still problems to overcome 
for her. Her learning disability is so mild and doesn't 
appreciably affect her school work that I have not even told 
the school system that she has one! 
Erica is another story. She apparently has all of 
Craig's problems and has attention deficit disorder too. 
But by the time Erica entered school, I had already figured 
out the school system and the correct approach for getting 
her through it. I had her evaluated in kindergarten by the 
same private psychologist who tested Craig. Erica was 
diagnosed and placed much earlier than Craig. The teachers 
and administrators now work with me and not against me. 
There is a much better relationship. I still have to be her 
advocate at school, but there aren't any more "battles". 
Having pertinent federal and state laws has helped signifi­
cantly. The terms "free appropriate public education" and 
"parent participation" work wonders. 
Now, my greatest frustration is with the college and 
university curriculum for future teachers. This curriculum 
is absolutely abysmal in preparing regular classroom teach­
ers to deal with total inclusion of students who happen to 
have disabilities. As far as I can tell from reading the 
course requirements in catalogues from several colleges and 
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universities, there haven't been a lot of changes made since 
I went to college in 1965. This lack of teacher training 
in inclusion of children with disabilities is devastating 
for the students--handicapped and non-handicapped--and for 
the teachers. Not all children with disabilities should be 
totally included; it should still be a parent option. 
Until this school year, I have been absolutely against 
total inclusion for Erica. She was capable, but not all of 
her teachers were. The teachers as a whole want to include 
and educate all children, but they don't know how! No one 
has ever shown them, or allowed them, to experience working 
with children who are physically or mentally challenged. 
Unless teachers have personal experiences with children with 
disabilities, that first child included in their classroom 
may be a first encounter. 
Some disabilities can be very frightening to the aver­
age person. Teachers are not superpeople. They are just 
people. If they have never been around children with dis­
abilities, how are they supposed to know how to relate to 
them or to interact with them, much less teach them? Every 
child is an unique individual. All children are children. 
No child is the sum of his or her disabilities! 
The elementary and secondary teacher-preparation cur­
ricula need to include courses on educational law, teaching 
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children with disabilities, classroom modifications that can 
be made to accommodate these children and hands-on experi­
ence in relating to children with disabilities. All student 
teachers practice teach in regular classrooms. They must 
also spend time in classrooms with children with disabili­
ties. This would help alleviate some of the "fear" and 
misunderstanding associated with children with disabilities. 
The second area that desperately needs reform is the 
system of support for classroom teachers when it comes to 
children with disabilities. There are systems in place, but 
these aren't sufficient. Teachers already in the system 
need more opportunities to learn about children with dis­
abilities. This should not cause additional stress to an 
already stressful occupation, but it should be hands-on 
experience, not just theoretical. 
There needs to be more communication on a very regular 
basis to support that teacher and the other students in the 
classroom when a child with disabilities is included. This 
would help ease the transition. Not all disabilities are 
visible or easily understood. The "invisible" disabilities 
can be the most difficult to understand because the differ­
ences can't be seen. Children will adjust to individual 
differences if they understand the "what" and "why" of any 
situation. Children are naturally curious and will ask 
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questions. A lot of the time, adults don't give children 
enough credit for coping with these circumstances. 
It has been my personal experience in teaching that the 
students handle inclusion situations much better than do 
their parents and some of their teachers. There also needs 
to be some support or system for educating the other par­
ents. It has been the experience of parents of children 
with physical and/or mental disabilities that I have worked 
with that the earlier their children are included in regular 
classrooms, the quicker the other children accept them. 
Total inclusion is the trend of the future. Are we ready? 
Is public education ready? Are classroom teachers and 
administrators ready? I don't think so, yet! 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
What legal rights do exceptional children and children 
with disabilities have in public education? Do they have 
the right to the same free appropriate public education as 
"normal" students? Should exceptional children be excluded 
from or included in a program solely because of their dis­
abilities? Can educators include or exclude children not 
qualifying as exceptional solely because of their disabili­
ties? What services must be provided? What position would 
a school administrator be able to defend regarding similar 
issues in a court of law? These questions are answered in 
this investigation of the legal aspects of special education 
with respect to program inclusion or exclusion based solely 
on disabilities. 
Initially in Colonial America, the education of chil­
dren was conducted at home by parents or guardians. The 
primary purpose of education was religious in nature and 
closely tied to the established religion of each regional 
area. Education was not provided equally to all children. 
There was considerable contrast in the education of differ­
ent classes of children. Apprenticeship training was avail­
able in all the colonies for poor and orphaned children, but 
2 
the children of affluent colonists had many educational 
opportunities available to them, ranging from being tutored 
at home to being sent back to England to be educated. 
Children with any disabilities were taken care of by fami­
lies with support from the community. 
Education of children with disabilities is first spe­
cifically mentioned in conjunction with Thomas H. Gallaudet, 
a Connecticut minister. In 1817, this pioneer in education 
for the disabled founded the first elementary school for the 
deaf, dumb, and blind in America. 
Edward M. Gallaudet continued the work his father, 
Thomas, had begun by becoming the first superintendent of 
the Columbia Institute for Deaf and Blind and Dumb in Wash­
ington, D.C. in 1858. This institution, now called 
Gallaudet University, established a higher level of educa­
tional opportunities for students with disabilities. 
Another pioneer in the field of educating children with 
disabilities, Edward Seguin a French physician and a Saint-
Simonian, is linked to the education of "mental defectives." 
As Frank Graves states in his book, A Student's History of 
Education, written in 1915, 
One of the most patent evidences of the growth of 
the humane spirit in modern times is found in the uni­
versal attention now given to the education of mental 
defectives. This movement was given its greatest im­
pulse through Edward Seguin, who came to the United 
States in 1850 and developed his methods here. 
3 
. . . Although there has grown up a tendency to intro­
duce intellectual elements into the training of the 
feeble-minded, the advantages of such a procedure are 
doubtful. 
Until the early 1970's, people with handicapping condi­
tions were either kept at home and schooled there, if at 
all, or put into institutions. In the landmark case of 
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka^, the U.S. Supreme 
Court established the principle of extending equal access to 
educational opportunities to all children of school age as a 
basic constitutional entitlement. Even though Brown is 
about school desegregation, it has been the basis for cases 
involving children with handicaps because of the many simi­
larities between the two groups of children. 
The first federal legislation specifically addressing 
the education of handicapped children was an amendment to 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-
10)(ESEA). It encouraged state education leaders to provide 
programs for handicapped children. One section of this 
amendment (P.L. 89-750) was passed in 1966. The next step 
for Congress was passing the Education of the Handicapped 
Act of 1968 (P.L. 90-247). In 1970, Congress repealed the 
^Frank P. Graves, A Student's History of Education 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1915), 426. 
2347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 689, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). 
1966 amendments to ESEA and passed P.L. 91-230 (The Educa­
tion of the Handicapped Act of 1970). 
Parents of children with handicaps began organizing. 
Support, groups of the 1950' s became advocacy groups of the 
1960's. In the early 1970's, parents of children with dis­
abilities seriously questioned the exclusion of their chil­
dren from public schools. They took their cases to state 
and federal courts. The issues under litigation included 
admission of their children to public schools and placement 
in appropriate educational programs. 
In the landmark case, Pennsylvania Association for 
Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (better 
known as P.A.R.C.) , the federal court's decision, even 
though it was finally settled with a consent decree, was the 
beginning of a deluge of litigation dealing with exceptional 
children. The court decision in Mills v. Board of Education 
of the District of Columbia^, broadened the principles set 
down in the P.A.R.C. case to include all exceptional chil­
dren and to provide due prpcess prior to any decisions made 
by educators regarding classification of students, exclusion 
of students from educational programs, or termination of 
student services. 
^334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), final consent 
agreement, 343 F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
*348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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Congress provided federal legislation to guarantee the 
rights of people with disabilities in one section of The 
Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-112). This 
law defined and protected the rights of people with dis­
abling conditions. Section 504 of this statute was applied 
to teachers with handicaps as well as to students, putting 
the burden of proof on the school system or college to prove 
that a qualified candidate with a disability was not exclud­
ed solely on the basis of that disability. In regard to § 
504 cases, the courts created the three-pronged standard: 
"1) Is the plaintiff a handicapped person under the law? 2) 
Is the activity involved one that receives federal assis­
tance? 3) Is the plaintiff a person who has been excluded 
from that activity solely because of his/her handicap?"** 
Passing of the Education Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-
380) extended due process protection to parents of 
handicapped children (between ages thirteen and twenty-
one) in such matters as testing, identification, place­
ment, record examination, and program finance. 
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 
94-142) was passed by Congress in November, 1975. This 
created by law the due process hearing that is binding on 
all the parties. This much-litigated provision is impressed 
5 H. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 401. 
688 Stat. 484 (1976), Ibid. 
6 
on every teacher of exceptional children. This law also 
mandated that each child be given an I.E.P. (Individualized 
Educational Program), which must be reviewed annually. 
"That no child of school age shall be arbitrarily or capri­
ciously denied admission to a public school became the law 
of the land."^ 
Statement of the Problem 
With the advent of the civil rights movement in America 
in the 1960's, equality of education for all students has 
been in the forefront of judicial decisions. With the 
passage of P.L. 90-247 (The Education of the Handicapped Act 
of 1968), P.L. 91-230 (The Education of the Handicapped Act 
of 1970), P.L. 93-112 (The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 
1973), P.L. 93-380 (The Education Amendments of 1974), P.L. 
94-142 (The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975), P.L. 10i-336 (The Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990), and P.L. 101-476 (The Individuals with Disabilities 
Education Act of 1990), Congress has provided federal legis­
lation to define and protect the rights of individuals with 
disabilities and to guarantee due process for each indi­
vidual. However, these laws have also created problems for 
educators and administrators because Congress did not clear-
1 H. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 256. 
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ly define every aspect and guarantee of these mandates. It 
is up to the courts to clarify. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is 1) to determine the cru­
cial issues regarding the legal rights of exceptional chil­
dren and children with disabilities in terms of educational 
program exclusion or inclusion; 2) to review and analyze 
federal statutes regarding program inclusion or exclusion 
based solely on a disability; 3) to review and analyze case 
law related to these statutes; and 4) to suggest guidelines 
for practicing school administrators who must make the 
decisions of inclusion or exclusion regarding educational 
programs. 
Questions 
This study will answer the following research questions 
related to educational program exclusion or inclusion: 
1. What is revealed in selected current literature 
regarding the legal rights of exceptional children and 
children with disabilities in public education? 
2. What is the status of educational program inclusion 
or exclusion based solely upon a disability as outlined in 
federal statutes? 
3. What is the status of cases involving children with 
disabilities? 
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4. What discernible patterns and trends can be identi­
fied in judicial decisions? 
5. What legal guidelines can be set forth as a result 
of this research to aid administrators and school board 
members? 
Design of the Study 
This study employs an analysis of pertinent legal and 
court documents that primarily follows qualitative design 
processes. As a legal dissertation, the procedures involve 
a descriptive and content analytic research approach to 
interpret the pertinent laws and legal decisions. In this 
method the writer attempts to provide an accurate picture of 
a particular situation or phenomenon, to identify variables 
that exist, and to describe and explain relationships be­
tween these variables. The design includes a review of 
selected legal sources, analysis of cases, and results 
obtained from using the methodology described in the next 
section. 
Methodology 
The methodology used in this study involves analysis of 
judicial decisions, the study of case law and analysis of 
federal and selected state statutes. Primary sources were 
state and federal court decisions involving exceptional 
children and children with disabilities. Students attended 
9 
or had attended either elementary or secondary public 
schools. All cases involved a public school system or 
district. No cases involving a private elementary or sec­
ondary school as plaintiff or defendant were analyzed. No 
cases involving public or private community college, college 
or university students were reviewed. 
Each court decision was read and analyzed on the basis 
of the following: 1) reason suit was brought, 2) court 
findings of original suit, 3) any appeals made, 4) rulings 
of appellate court, 5) legal ramifications of each suit, 
and 6) the effects on public school administrators and/or 
school policy. Primary sources of information for case 
analysis were found in the National Reporter System, which 
includes Federal Supplement, Federal Reporter (Second Se­
ries), Federal Reporter (Third Series), Atlantic Reporter, 
South Eastern Reporter (Second Series), and North Eastern 
Reporter, and the United States Repoi^ts, Supreme Court 
Reporter, U.S. Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition 
(Second Series). Secondary sources used for case analysis 
were federal and states statutes and the Educational Law 
Reporter. Sources for review of the literature in the field 
were School Law Bulletin, National Organization on Legal 
Problems of Education (NOLPE) publications, Educational 
Resources Information Center (ERIC) documents, Current Index 
to Journals in Education, Current Law Index, Index to Legal 
10 
Periodicals, current periodicals, and recent books on law in 
the public schools. One additional source of information 
was a compilation of complaints received from parents by the 
Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education 
in Washington, D.C. from January, 1991 to March, 1993. Due 
to the large volume and similarity of complaints, one month 
was chosen as representative of the types of complaints that 
are received. 
A Lexis computer search of court cases related to 
program inclusion or exclusion solely based on a disability 
was run. Legal cases were "shepardized" using Shepard's 
Citations to provide a history of related court decisions as 
well as a treatment of the decisions. This allowed the 
researcher to rely on the applicable court holding. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited to analysis of federal statutes 
and some state statutes (since only five states have differ­
ent wording) and federal and some state court decisions 
based on a student's program inclusion or exclusion based 
solely on a disability using the time frame of 1978 to 1993. 
These cases involve only public elementary or secondary 
schools. Office of Civil Rights (OCR) complaints from 
January-, 1990 to June, 1993 were considered only as a basis 
for future trends. Complaints from a representative month 
were chosen to review in depth. 
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Definition of Terms 
The following words and phrases are key terms utilized 
in this paper. The source of these definitions was Black's 
Law Dictionarjft, unless otherwise stated. 
Affirmed -- A word that indicates in a citation to a 
case that a higher court has agreed with the result, and 
usually the reasoning, of a lower court and approved the 
q 
judgement of the lower court. 
Amicus curiae—Means, literally, friend of the court. 
A person with strong interest in or views on the subject 
matter of an action, but not a party to the action, may 
petition to file a brief. Such amicus curiae briefs are 
commonly filed in appeals concerning matters of a broad 
public interest; e.g. civil rights cases. 
Appeal -- The process whereby a court of appeals re­
views the record of proceedings and judgment of a lower 
court to determine if errors of law or fact were made which 
might lead to a reversal or modification of the lower 
court's decision. If substantial errors are not found, the 
9 
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, (St. Paul, 
Minn: West Publishing Co., 1990). 
q 
H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
Colorado: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 335. 
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lower court's decision will be affirmed. If they are, its 
decision will be reversed or modified.*" 
Appropriate-- especially suitable or compatible; fit­
ting .11 
Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) -- a syndrome of 
learning and behavioral problems that is not caused by any 
serious underlying physical or mental disorder and is char­
acterized especially by difficulty in sustaining attention, 
by impulsive behavior (as in speaking out of turn), and 
1 0  
usually by excessive activity. 
Burden of proof--In the law of evidence, the necessity 
or duty of affirmatively proving a fact or facts in dispute 
on an issue raised between the parties in a case. The 
obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite 
degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier 
of fact or the court. 
Certiorari--A writ of common law origin issued by a 
superior to an inferior court requiring the latter to pro­
duce a certified record of a particular case tried therein. 
The writ is issued in order that the court issuing the writ 
may inspect the proceedings and determine where there have 
Frederick C. Mish, Ed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: Mei'riam-Webster, 
Incorporated, 1993), 57. 
I2Ibid. , 74. 
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been any irregularities. It is most commonly used to refer 
to the Supreme Court of the United States, which uses the 
writ of certiorari as a discretionary device to choose the 
cases it wishes to hear. 
Children with disabilities—means children--(i) with 
mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, 
speech or language impairments, visual impairments including 
blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impair­
ments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impair­
ments, or specific learning disabilities; and (ii) who, by 
reason thereof, need special education and related ser-
n vices. 
Consent—Agreement; approval; permission; the act or 
result of coming into harmony or accord. Consent is an act 
of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing 
as in a balance the good or evil on each side. It means 
voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and exer­
cise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent 
choice to do something proposed by another. Consent is 
implied in every agreement. It is an act unclouded by 
fraud, duress, or sometimes even by mistake. 
Consent decree--A judgement entered by consent of the 
parties, whereby the defendant agrees to stop alleged ille­
gal activity without admitting guilt or wrongdoing. [I]t is 
1320 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(l)(A)(i)-(ii) (1990). 
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not properly a judicial sentence, but is in the nature of a 
solemn contract or agreement of the parties, made under the 
sanction of the court, and in effect an admission by them 
that the decree is a just determination of their rights upon 
the real facts of the case, if such facts had been proved. 
Declaratory relief-- See Declaratory judgment. 
Declaratory judgment—Statutory remedy for the deter­
mination of a justiciable controversy where the plaintiff is 
in doubt as to his legal rights. A binding adjudication of 
the rights and status of litigants even though no consequen­
tial relief is awarded. 
De novo — anew: afresh; a second time. 
Disability--The want of legal capacity to perform an 
act. Term is generally used to indicate an incapacity for 
the full enjoyment of ordinary legal rights; thus, persons 
under age, insane persons, and convicts are said to be under 
legal disability. Absence of competent physical, intellec­
tual, or moral powers; impairment of eaz^ning capacity; loss 
of physical function that reduces efficiency; inability to 
work. [Under General Classification are these definitions] 
A physical disability is a disability or incapacity caused 
by physical defect or infirmity, or bodily imperfection, or 
mental weakness or alienation; as distinguished from civil 
disability, which relates to the civil status or condition 
of the person, and which is imposed by the law. 
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Pisable--Ordinarily. to take away the ability of, to 
render incapable of proper and effective action. 
Disabled person—Person who lacks legal capacity to act 
sui Juris or one who is physically or mentally disabled from 
acting in his own behalf or from pursuing occupation. 
Due Process of Law--Law in its regular course of admin­
istration through courts of justice. "Law of the Land," "due 
course of law," and "due process of law" are synonymous. 
Due process rights—All rights which are of such funda­
mental importance as to require compliance with due process 
standards of fairness and justice. 
EAHCA--For the purposes of this paper, the acronym 
EAHCA (The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 
1975) is used when referring only to P.L. 94-142. 
EHA—For the purposes of this paper, the acronym EHA is 
used when referring to the Education of the Handicapped Act 
and all amendments as listed in 20 U.S.C.A. §§1400 et seq. 
Eleventh Amendment—The Judicial power of the United 
States shall not be construed to extend to.any suit in law 
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State.^ 
^U.S.Const, amend. XI. 
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Exceptional —deviating from the norm: as having above 
or below average intelligence; physically handicapped ^ 
Exclusion--Denial of entry or admittance. 
Fifth Amendment --The amendment to the federal Consti­
tution that guarantees that the rights of life, liberty, and 
property will not be taken from a citizen by the federal 
government without due process of law. Due process guaran­
tees apply to state and local governments under the Four-
| e 
teenth Amendment. 
First Amendment -- Congress shall make no law respect­
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble 
and to petition the Government for a redress of grie-
17 vances. 
Fourteenth Amendment -- The amendment to the federal 
Constitution that applies to the states (not the federal 
government, which is bound by the first 10 amendments) and 
15 Frederick C. Mish, Ed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated, 1993), 404. 
. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
Colorado: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 338. 
17 U.S. Const, amend. I. 
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guarantees the rights of due process and equal protection to 
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the citizens of each state. 
Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE)--special 
education and related services that (A) have been provided 
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, 
and without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State 
educational agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, 
elementary, or secondary school education in the State 
involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the indi­
vidualized education program required under section 
1414(a)(5) of this title.^ 
Handicapped—(1915) Having a physical or mental dis­
ability that substantially limits activity esp. in relation 
20 to employment or education. 
IDEA--For the purposes of this paper, the acronym IDEA 
is used when referring to the Individual with Disabilities 
Education Act and all amendments as listed in 20 U.S.C.A. 
§§1400 et seq, 1990. 
Indus ion--refers to the opportunity for all students 
to participate in the totality of the school experience. It 
18 H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
Colorado: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 338. 
1920 U.S.C.A. § 1401 ( a) (18 ) (1990). 
on 
Frederick C. Mish, Ed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated, 1993), 526. 
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includes integration into regular classrooms in neighborhood 
? I schools for both educational and social opportunities. 
In .junction--A court order prohibiting someone from 
doing some specific act or commanding someone to undo some 
wrong or injury. A judicial process operating in personam, 
and requiring person to whom it is directed to do or refrain 
from doing a particular thing. 
Learning Disabled --(1973); having difficulty in learn­
ing a basic scholastic skill because of a disorder (as 
dyslexia or attention deficit disorder) that interferes with 
22 the learning process. 
Least Restrictive Environment—Each public agency shall 
ensure--(l) That to the maximum extent appropriate, children 
with disabilities, including children in public and private 
institutions or other care facilities, are educated with 
children who are non-disabled; and (2) That special classes, 
separate schooling or other removal of children with dis­
abilities from the regular educational environment occurs 
only when the nature or severity of the disability is such 
2 1  Sharon H. Davis, Report Card to the Nation on 
Inclusion in Education of Students with Mental Retardation 
(Arlington, TX: The ARC, 1992), 2, ERIC ED 352 778. 
11 Frederick C. Mish, Ed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated, 1993), 663. 
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that education in regular classes with the use of supplemen-
tary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 
Moot - A subject for argument; unsettled; undecided. A 
moot point is one not settled by judicial decisions. 
Moot case—A case is "moot" when a determination is 
sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have a 
practical effect on the existing controversy. Question is 
"moot" when it presents no actual controversy or where the 
issues have ceased to exist. 
Nexus - Connection, link; a connected group or 
series^ 
Permanent in.iunction--One intended to remain in force 
until the final termination of the particular suit. 
Perpetual in.iunction—An injunction which finally 
disposes of the suit, and is indefinite in point of time. 
Preliminary in.iunction--An injunction granted at the 
institution of a suit, to restrain the defendant from doing 
or continuing some act, the right which is in dispute, and 
which may either be discharged or made perpetual, according 
to the result of the controversy, as soon as the rights of 
the parties are determined. Fed.R.Civil P. 65. 
23 3 4 C.F.R § 300.550 (1993). 
24 Frederick C. Mish, Ed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated, 1993), 783. 
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Reasonable - Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable 
under the circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in 
view. 
Related services—means transportation, and such devel­
opmental, corrective, and other supportive services (in­
cluding speech pathology and audiology, psychological ser­
vices, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, in­
cluding therapeutic recreation, social work services, coun­
seling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and 
mental services, except that such medical services shall be 
diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as may be required 
to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special 
education, and includes the early identification and assess-
9 K 
ment of disabling conditions in children. 
Relief--Deliverance from oppressive, wrong, or injus­
tice. In this sense it is used as a general designation of 
the assistance, redress, or benefit which a complainant 
seeks at the hands of a court, particularly in equity. 
Remand - To send back. The act of an appellate court 
when it sends a case back to the trial court and orders the 
trial court to conduct limited new hearings or an entire new 
trial, or to take some further action. 
2520 U.S.C.A. § 1401 ( a) (17 ) ( 1990). 
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Retarded --slow or limited in intellectual or emotional 
development or academic progress 
Reverse—To overthrow, vacate, set aside, make void, 
annul, repeal, or revoke; as, to reverse a judgement, sen­
tence or decree of a lower court by an appellate court. 
Special education—means specially designed instruc-
* 
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique 
needs of a child with a disability, including --(A) instruc­
tion conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals 
and institutions, and in other settings; and (B) instruction 
27 in physical education. 
Special law—One relating to particular persons or 
things; one made for individual cases or for particular 
places or districts; one operating upon a selected class, 
rather than upon the public generally. 
"Stay-put provision"--During the pendency of any pro­
ceeding conducted pursuant to this section, unless the state 
or local educational agency and the parents or guardian 
otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current 
educational placement of such child, or, if applying for 
initial admission to a public school, shall, with the con­
sent of the parents or guardian, be placed in the public 
Frederick C. Mish, Ed. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: Merriam-Webster, 
Incorporated, 1993), 999. 
2720 U.S.C.A. § 1401 ( a) (16 ) (1990). 
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school program until all such proceedings have been complet-
, 28 ed. 
Summary .judgement--Procedural device available for 
prompt and expeditious disposition of controversy without 
trial when there is no dispute as to either material fact or 
inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if only 
question of law is involved. Federal Rule of Civil Proce­
dure 56 permits any party to a civil action to move for a 
summary judgement on a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim. 
Transition services—means a coordinated set of activi­
ties for a student, designed within an outcome-oriented 
process, which promotes movement from school to post-school 
activities, including post-secondary education, vocational 
training, integrated employment (including support employ­
ment), continuing and adult education, adult services, 
29 independent living, or community participation. 
Vacated - To annul; to set aside; to cancel or rescind; 
to render an act void; as to vacate an entry of record, or a 
judgement. 
Organization of the Study 
Chapter I contains an introduction, the statement of 
the problem, the purpose of the study, the questions to be 
2820 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(3) (1990). 
2320 U.S.C.A. § 1401 ( a) (19 ) (1990). 
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answered, the design of the study, the methodology, the 
limitations of the study, the definition of terms and orga­
nization of the study. 
Chapter II begins with a brief statement to provide a 
general context for the evolution of special education, and 
traces the evolution of special education programs and 
student rights. An examination of current literature from 
legal sources helped to determine trends. Landmark cases 
Oft 
beginning with Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 
(1954) and running into 1978 were summarized. The Individu­
als with Disabilities Education Act of 1990 (IDEA) and The 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) were reviewed 
because they are the most recent legislation from Congress 
dealing with disabilities. 
Chapter III includes a review of federal statutes and 
selected state statutes dealing with rights of exceptional 
children and children with disabilities to be included or 
excluded from educational programs because of their disabil­
ities. The relationships between the Public Laws and the 
federal statutes are discussed. The relationship of recent 
amendments to the acts is reviewed. 
Chapter IV includes analysis of relevant legal cases of 
educational program inclusion or exclusion solely because of 
30347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 689, 98 L.Ed. 873 ( 1954). 
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disabilities. A section on future trends, based on selected 
current OCR complaints filed by parents, is included. 
Chapter V summarizes the findings of this research and 
offers answers to the research questions. It provides some 
guidelines for administrators and school board members con­
fronted with decisions on student participation in programs 
regardless of a disability. Recommendations for further 
study also are included. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE 
Brief Context for Special Education* 
Before reviewing the literature related to exceptional 
children and children with disabilities, it seems appropri­
ate to review some context for the idea of free and appro­
priate public education for all students, especially the 
disabled. Educational philosophies are tied to the values 
of a nation and are in a constant state of transition. As a 
society changes and evolves so do the educational philosophy 
and system. 
The colonists brought their philosophies of education 
and schools to the United States. Some strife and conflicts 
of the time in Europe were reflected in the colonies. In 
Massachusetts, the schooling of children at home didn't seem 
This section draws from various sources such as Butts 
andCremin, A History of Education in American Culture (1953); 
Cremin, American Education: The National Experience 1783-1876 
(1980); Cubberley, A Brief History of Education (1922); Edgar, 
Social Foundations of Education (1965); Graves, A Student's 
History of Education (1920); Johnson, Old-time Schools and 
School-books (1925); Meyer, The Development of Education in 
the Twentieth Century (1939); Teeter, The Opening Up of 
American Education (1983); Turnbull, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (1990); 
Turnbull, The Law and The Mentally Handicapped in North 
Carolina (1980); Tyack, James and Benavot, Law and the Shaping 
of Public Education, 1785-1954 (1987); Van Cleve, ed. 
Gallaudet Encyclopedia of Deaf People and Deafness, (1987). 
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to accomplish the purposes of education to suit colonial 
of f ic ials. 
In 1642, twelve years after the settlement of Bos­
ton, the General Court of Massachusetts, "taking into 
consideration the great neglect of many parents and 
guardians in training up their children in learning and 
labor which may be profitable to the commonwealth," 
ordered that the selectmen in every town should have 
power to take account of all parents and masters as to 
their children's education and employment. . .He [the 
selectman] must see that all the children learned to 
read, and that they were taught to understand the prin­
ciples of religion and the capital laws of the country, 
and finally, he must make sure that they were put to 
some useful work. 
The idea of different educational opportunities for differ­
ent classes of people came with the colonists from England 
and Europe. 
[T]he idea of a classical higher and secondary training 
for the upper classes. . .and but little in the way of 
elementary education, except private "dame" schools and 
the catechetical training by the clergy. There were, 
in addition, the family "tutorial" education. . . for 
the children of the wealthy, and evident attempts at 
perpetuating the old English industrial training 
through apprenticeship for orphans and children of the 
poor. 
At least until 1954, (the Brown case), in American 
education, the treatment of the exceptional child includes a 
focus on obvious impairments or disabling categories or on 
2 Clifton Johnson, Old-time Schools and School-books, 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1904), 1. 
3 Frank P. Graves, A Student's History of Education 
(New York: The MacMillian Company, 1915), 191. 
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treatment of the child as a second-class citizen. These 
categories included the deaf, dumb, blind, mentally retard­
ed, crippled, and Negroes. Other disabilities were later 
"discovered" and acknowledged by society. 
The 19th century was a time of dramatic social changes 
for the entire world. As the development of new machinery 
replaced hand tools, and as water, steam or electric power 
supplanted muscle power provided by men and beasts, society 
was changed forever. 
America began the arduous change from an agrarian 
economy to an industrial economy and cottage industries were 
replaced by the factory system. The barbarous working 
conditions in some factories impelled workers to fight to 
improve conditions by forming unions, lobbying for labor 
legislation and child labor laws, and demanding civil 
rights. Education was also expex-iencing dramatic changes, 
including education of handicapped youth. 
The earliest federal role -- creating special schools 
for the mentally ill, blind, and deaf between the 1820s 
and the 1870s -- paralleled a movement at the state 
level, in which state schools for the handicapped were 
established as early as 1823. 
Some individuals were working to provide education for 
handicapped children. Thomas Hopkins Gallaudet, a Connecti-
. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
Colorado: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 13. 
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cut minister, was striving" to educate the deaf, blind and 
dumb children. He went to Europe to study the current 
methods of educating" the deaf. When Gallaudet returned to 
America, he brought a brilliant deaf teacher named Laurent 
Clerc. The two men toured the eastern seaboard, raising 
donations for a school for the deaf. Equally as important 
as raising funds, they increased public awareness that the 
deaf could be educated and, in fact, could perform intelli­
gently. In 1817, at Hartford, Connecticut, Gallaudet opened 
the first American elementary school for the deaf and dumb. 
Amos Kendall and several other wealthy citizens of 
Washington, D.C., became interested in the education of 
deaf. In fact, Kendall was guardian for five deaf young­
sters. With the support of an act of Congress, Kendall and 
several other individuals founded the Columbia Institute for 
the Deaf and Dumb and Blind in 1856. Kendall asked Edward 
M. Gallaudet, son of Thomas Gallaudet, to become the first 
superintendent of this institute, located in Washington, 
D.C. Edward began his duties in 1857. He remained with the 
Institute for 54 years. This institution was renamed 
Gallaudet University in honor of Edward Gallaudet. 
During this same period, Samuel G. Howe, superintendent 
of the Perkins Institute of the Blind in Boston, Massachu­
setts, began teaching Laura Bridgeman, a deaf-blind child. 
His success was remarkable, and Laura went on to become a 
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teacher of the blind, deaf and dumb. Helen Keller's teach­
er, Annie Sullivan, was a student of the Perkins Institute, 
The "challenge" of educating "mental defectives," Ne­
groes and women was also being explored during this century. 
Edward Seguin, a French physician, was instrumental in the 
education of "feeble-minded" children. He opened a school 
for "idiots" in Paris. He studied idiocy and discovered 
that it was caused by arrested development and not by a 
malformation of the brain as was the popular belief. He 
came to the United States in 1850 to practice as a physi­
cian. From 1854 to 1857 he worked with Harvey Wilbur at his 
Institution in Syracuse, New York. Seguin later opened a 
school for the "feeble-minded" in New York. 
Attitudes toward education of Negroes were also chang­
ing. Myrtilla Miner was born in New York and handicapped 
with a "spinal" disease. She became interested in the 
education of "colored" girls while she was an instructor in 
a private school for daughters of planters. In 1851, she 
opened a "normal" school for colored girls in Washington, 
D.C. It was illegal to educate Negroes in southern states. 
The Civil War advanced the education of black men, but not 
necessarily of women, either black or white. 
Formal education of women past the basic elementary 
level was not illegal, but it was not encouraged "... 
girls' brains were 'too light, their foreheads too small, 
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their reasoning powers too underdeveloped, and their emo­
tions too easily worked upon to make serious students.'"^ 
Education wasn't "good" for women because it would make them 
discontented. An education would also make them coarse and 
unmarriageable. 
While American public education opened a wee crack 
to admit an increasing number of blacks in the late 
19t,h Century, no substantial accommodation was made for 
fully one half the white population: females of every 
age. The implication of a black's inferiority was 
greatly undermined once he was taken out of the insti­
tution that confined him to that debasement. . . .No 
act of Congress, no amendment of Constitution, no 
judgement of the Supreme Court could remove from women 
the weaknesses and uselessness ascribed to them for 
countless centuries. 
While women could get a basic elementary education, there 
were very few high schools for them and even fewer colleges. 
In 1828, John Kingsbury founded his "Young Ladies' High 
School" in Providence, Rhode Island. Mary Lyons established 
the Mount Holyoke Female Seminary in 1837 to provide women 
who wanted to teach, the course work approximately equiva­
lent to college courses for men. Women were allowed to 
become teachers, but female teachers of this era were not 
allowed to marry. 
5 Ruskin Teeter. The Opening Up of American Education 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1983), 109. 
"ibid. 
'ibid. , 105. 
31 
A shift in treatment of exceptional children began 
after World War I and just before World War II. In 1939, 
Adolph Meyer presented the following quote in the section on 
"Educating Exceptional Children" under the subheading titled 
"Defective Children:" 
[T]wentieth-century education seeks for each child an 
education which will be in harmony with his native 
capacities. There are, unfortunately, many thousands 
of youngsters who by virtue of their inheritance or the 
influence of their environment, are so constituted that 
they can profit very little from what the average 
school has to offer. In this group there are children 
who vary from the normal in either direction. Among 
them are the undernourished, the physically handi­
capped, and the mentally defective, as well as those 
who excel in mind and body. 
Meyer discussed different forms of special education that 
had been developed to ensure that exceptional children would 
have confidence, self-respect and self-sufficiency. The key 
word in Meyer's quote is "average" school. The average 
school system was not able to educate these children "who 
vary from the normal in either direction," but their exis­
tence was acknowledged. There also weren't any specific 
laws to cover children with disabilities or the right of all 
children to attend public schools. They weren't encouraged 
or allowed to attend public school. This trend continued 
until the United States Supreme Court was asked to ruled on 
p 
'Adolph E. Meyer. The Development of Education in the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Prerit ice-Hall, Inc., 1939), 154. 
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Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka in 1954. This case 
was actually a desegregation case and is cited as the cata­
lyst needed to give "birth" to the civil rights movement of 
the 1960's in America. It also influenced parents of chil­
dren with disabilities. 
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
In the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education of 
Q 
Topeka, the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle 
of extending equal access to educational opportunities to 
all children of school age, as a basic constitutional 
ent itlement. 
Brown was a landmark because it had an impact on so 
many aspects of educational law and procedure: 
. . .Just as Brown was the first case on the battle­
field of racial desegregation of schools, it was the 
seed that gave birth to other civil rights battles and 
to grounds for successful challenges to governmental 
discrimination against certain persons because of their 
unalterable personal characteristics (such as race or 
sex). Brown gave rise to the right-to-education cases, 
and they in turn helped establish other rights for 
handicapped persons. The point--so obvious, but so 
important--is that judicial resolution of educational 
issues on constitutional grounds becomes precedent for 
judicial resolution of related civil rights issues on 
similar constitutional grounds. 
9 347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 689, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). 
. Rutherford Turnbull III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 9. 
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This court case gave parents of children with disabili­
ties some hope and possibly some "legal ground" to stand on. 
Parents of handicapped children began to organize locally 
and nationally. Advocacy groups such as The Arc (formerly 
The Association for Retarded Citizens of the United States 
and originally, The National Association for Retarded 
Children/Citizens) and The Council for Exceptional Children 
(CEC) were formed in the 1950's and 1960's. The parent 
movement gained increasing influence in the federal and 
state arenas in the 1960's. The Bureau of Education for the 
Handicapped, part of the Office of Education, was created by 
the ESEA Amendments of 1966. 
Earl Warren was the Chief Justice of the United States 
Supreme Court from 1953 through 1969. Following his lead, 
the Court "took a liberal and expansive approach to the 
constitutional issues, including the application of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the operation 
of public schools."** 
The Supreme Court rulings during the 1950's and 1960's 
were the impetus the parent movement in the United States 
needed. Parents now had constitutional grounds to fight for 
inclusion of their children in public education programs. 
"[T]he Warren Court's attitude in Brown declared that the 
^Robert E. Phay. "Due Process and the Public Schools 
in the Seventies and Eighties." School Law Bulletin, 13 
(Fall, 1982): 1. 
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importance of education in our society made it imperative to 
provide every child of school age with access to an educa-
| Q
tion opportunity, absent discrimination." 
Encouraged by the ruling in Brown, parents of children 
with handicaps began to test, in court, this opportunity for 
education as "a right which must be made available to all on 
I 3 equal terms. 
Although Brown established the right to an equal educa­
tional opportunity based upon the Fourteenth Amendment, 
it was not until Pennsylvania Association for Retarded 
Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 
Mills v. D. C Board of Education that Brown became 
meaningful for handicapped children. 
The PARC case was a class-action suit brought by parents of 
retarded children in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
These children were being excluded from public education and 
training solely because they were retarded. The case was 
finally settled with a consent decree that was binding 
solely on the parties of the case. 
[T]he actual legal value of the PARC decision is found 
in what the district court suggested; it simply set 
forth a plan to provide for retarded children in Penn-
12 H. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 397. 
13347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
14 H. Rutherford Turnbull III. Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 30. 
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sylvania who, up to that time, had been excluded from 
receiving educational opportunities in the schools of 
the Commonwealth. 
Not only was the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to provide an 
education for retarded students, but it was to search ac­
tively for and identify retarded children who had been 
excluded from public education before that point. 
1 fi Mills v. District of Columbia Board of Education was 
brought by parents of Peter Mills and six other children who 
had a variety of handicaps, but who were not mentally re­
tarded. The parents alleged that the labeling of their 
children was an "exclusionary practice" that violated their 
constitutional rights to due process under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The children were being denied equal 
access to a public education. While the Mills decision 
expanded the principles set down in PARC to include all 
handicapped children, it also included a "due process" 
section. This court order stated that educators provide due 
process prior to any decisions made regarding classification 
of students, exclusion of students from educational pro­
grams, or termination of student services. 
15 H. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 395. 
15348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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The San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
11 
guez case has had a significant effect on special educa­
tion case law. Rodriguez was a challenge to the way the 
State of Texas financed its public schools and not specifi­
cally a special education case. The Supreme Court reversed 
the lower court's decision and found in favor of the State 
of Texas. 
From 1954 to 1973 (with the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Rodriguez) the emphasis was on 
making certain, by application of fourteenth amendment 
guarantees of equal protection and due process, that 
the 'doors to equal educational opportunity' were 
opened to every eligible child. . . .The primary focus 
of attention in the Post-Rodriguez era, however, was 
redirected away from efforts to 'open public school 
doors' to all children, and courts of law turned their 
attention to the issue of ensuring quality educational 
programs for children once they enter the school. 
One other case, Cuyahoga County Association for Retard-
| Q
ed Children & Adults v. Essex, needs to be mentioned even 
though it is not a landmark case. Cuyahoga began before the 
passage of P.L. 94-142 (the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975). In this case the federal district 
court ruled that children could not be excluded from or 
included in public education solely based on an I.Q. score. 
I7411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). 
18 H. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 397-398. 
19411 F.Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976). 
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In Cuyahoga, a class action was brought on the grounds of 
equal protection and due process, disputing the constitu­
tionality of the Ohio program of educating and training 
mentally handicapped children. The one important finding of 
the federal district court was that I.Q. scores alone could 
not determine whether a child would benefit from an educa­
tion. The Court stated: 
if children of particular I.Q. levels are being 'rub­
ber-stamped' into special education and/or out of the 
public school system without regard for the detailed 
standards . . . [it] might constitute denial of equal 
protection under the relevant statutes and regula­
tions . 
The Court saw "the handwriting on the wall" with the passage 
of P.L. 94-142 by Congress. With the appointment of the 
last five justices ". . .the Court since 1969 has moved with 
few exceptions to a more conservative interpretation and 
application of due process to the public schools.""' With 
the retirement of Justice Harry Blackmun in June, 1994, 
every current member of the United States Supreme Court was 
appointed during or after 1972. 
20Ibid., 60. 
^Robert E. Phay, (1982). "Due Process and the Public 
Schools in the Seventies and Eighties." School Law Bulletin, 
13 (Fall, 1982): 2. 
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Free Appropriate Public Education and 
Least Restrictive Environment 
After the 1990 amendments to the Education of the 
Handicapped Act, the EHA is known as the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act or IDEA. In passing this Act: 
The Congress finds that—(1) there are more than eight 
million children with disabilities in the United 
States; (2) the special educational needs of such 
children are not being fully met; (3) more than half of 
the children with disabilities in the United States do 
not receive appropriate educational services which 
would enable them to have full equality of opportunity; 
(4) one million of the children with disabilities in 
the United States are excluded entirely from the public 
school system and will not go through the educational 
process with their peers. 
One concept in IDEA is "to assure that all children 
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate 
23 public education," Unfortunately "appropriate" remains 
24 difficult to define and can even be controversial. IDEA 
also states "to assure that, to the maximum extent appropri­
ate, children with disabilities are educated with children 
2220 U.S.C.A. § 1400(b) (1 )-(5) . 
2320 U.S.C.A § 1400(c) ( 1990). 
See, e.g., Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S.176 
( 1982); Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 N.C. App. 260, 
293 S.E. 2d 687, disc, review denied, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E. 
2d 759 (1982), Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 744 F.2d 629 
(4th Cir. 1985), Burke County Bd. of Educ. v. Denton, 895 F.2d 
973 (4th Cir. 1990). 
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n p 
who are not disabled." This section pertains to main-
streaming or inclusion of children with disabilities in the 
classes of "regular" or non-disabled students to the maximum 
extent practicable. Placing a disabled child in the "least 
f)C 
restrictive environment"" (LRE) appropriate for the child, 
while receiving a free appropriate public education (FAPE) 
are two areas of current debate, both educationally and 
legally. "Yet a close look at the statutes and regulations 
reveal that FAPE and LRE are not competing requirements. 
Rather, each is an element in a decision-making process 
>)<! 
aimed at meeting the needs of a disabled child."" 
The term "free appropriate public education" means 
special education and related services which (A) have 
been provided at public expense, under public supervi­
sion and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include 
an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in the State involved, and (D) are 
provided in conformity with the individualized educa­
tion program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this 
title. 
Controversy also arises in the discussion of LRE. "[This] 
mandate is a primary consideration when courts are asked to 
25 2 0 U.S.C.A. § 1412 ( 5 ) ( B) ( 1990 ). 
2534 C.F.R. §§300.550-.556 (1990). 
27 Ann McColl, "Placement in the Least Restrictive 
Environment for Children with Disabilities," School Law 
Bulletin 23 (Winter 1992): 13. 
2820 U.S.C.A. § 1401 ( a) ( 18 ) ( 1990). 
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settle disputes between school districts and parents over a 
29 proposed special education program." "The statutory goal 
was to prevent systematic exclusion of children with dis­
abilities from mainstream schools and classrooms and to 
10 integrate these children with nondisabled children." 
The regulations under Section 504 (Sec. 104.33(b)) 
provide a third way to define appropriate educa­
tion. . . Like the EHA [now IDEA], Section 504 address­
es the requirement of appropriate or individualized 
education by requiring that schools follow a process 
and requires equivalency between the handicapped and 
the nonhandicapped. 
Exclusion of disabled students from educational pro­
grams has taken on different forms in recent years. "The 
assumption appeal's to be that a child can be either intelli-
gent or 'handicapped,' but is rarely--if ever--both. " 
As a general rule, the nation's public schools were 
highly ingenious and very successful in denying educa­
tional opportunities, equal or otherwise, to disabled 
children. . . . Exclusion occurs when children are 
denied education (denied access to all public educa­
tional programs or provided an inadequate education for 
2971 Ed.Law Rep. [369] (Feb 13, 1992). 
Oft 
David M. Engel, "Law, Culture, and Children with 
Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of 
Difference," Duke Law Journal 1991 (February, 1991): 175. 
'^H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
Colorado: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 128. 
•)? 
David M. Engel, "Law, Culture, and Children with 
Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of 
Difference," Duke Law Journal 1991 (February, 1991): 185. 
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their needs). Total Exclusion may involve the school's 
refusing to admit a child or placing him or her on a 
long waiting list. Exclusion also occurs when programs 
are inadequate or unresponsive to students' needs, 
. . . Another example of exclusion occurs when moder­
ately retarded children are put in large regular class­
es and given little or no training or education. 
Practices such as these constitute functional exclu­
sion. Although the child has access to a program, the 
program is of such a nature that the child cannot 
substantially benefit from it and therefore receives 
few or none of the intended benefits of education. 
Yet, while mainstreaming was including children with 
disabilities in a regular classroom for non-academic sub­
jects, such as recess, music, or lunch, inclusion has come 
to mean more. Mainstreaming can be another name for "least 
restrictive environment," and for educational program inclu­
sion. 
Inclusion refers to the opportunity for all students to 
participate in the totality of the school experience. 
It includes integration into regular classrooms in 
neighborhood schools for both educational and social 
opportuni t ies. 
Inclusion also means that children with disabilities inter­
act with nondisabled children. Mainstreaming of children 
with disabilities is one solution to the "LRE" language of 
IDEA. Another solution to interaction of disabled children 
0 0 
H. Rutherford Turnbull, III, Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
Colorado: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 14. 
Sharon H. Davis, Report Card to the Nation on 
Inclusion in Education of Students with Mental Retardation 
(Arlington, TX: The ARC, 1992), 2, ERIC ED 352 778. 
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with nondisabled children is to bring nondisabled children 
into special education classrooms. 
Some advocacy groups are endorsing total program inclu­
sion of children with disabilities and the elimination of 
the separate system restrictive placement. 
Only 6.7 percent of our nation's children with 
mental retardation were educated in regular classrooms 
in the 1989-90 school year. Clearly, few states con­
sider the regular classroom as the appropriate place­
ment for children with mental retardation. Only two 
states, Massachusetts and Vermont, have more than 50 
percent of children in this setting. Most states 
placed fewer than 5 percent in regular class. 
Parents are being instructed in and encouraged to use their 
civil rights by numerous advocacy groups. These groups are 
primarily comprised of parents of children with disabili­
ties. Some groups use the "each one teach one" principle to 
educate other parents about civil rights by using their own 
experiences and knowledge of federal law. 
On the other hand, some parents do not want their 
children in the mainstream of education. They think that 
their child would be served better in the long run in a 
0(j 
self-contained educational environment. The parents' 
opinions about inclusion in or exclusion from regular class­
rooms should be given serious consideration. After all, 
35Ibid., 17. 
See Gaudiello v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 
796 F.Supp. 849 (E.D. Pa. 1992). 
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parents have raised their children since birth, and they 
know their child better than anyone else. 
Many changes and much progress has [sic] occurred 
for students with disabilities since the 1970's. It is 
good to assess how far we have come but at the same 
time not to forget how far we have yet to go and more 
importantly, in what direction we are going. For 
example, this assessment must not overlook the fact 
that historically in seeking special educational ser­
vices for students with disabilities, we have in fact 
created and fostered a dual system^, a "separate system" 
for special and regular education. 
Parents must be extremely vigilant of the education their 
child with a disability receives and must assure that all 
procedures are followed correctly. In following these 
procedures, parents must not lose sight of what is in the 
best interest of their child concerning both placement and 
the LRE appropriate. 
As with any issue there are always at least two sides 
to it. What are the opinions of educators? In order to 
move one second-grader "to a 'more restrictive environment', 
[it] took almost nine months, hundreds of hours of work, and 
thousands of dollars to achieve." The child began exhib­
iting extremely disruptive behavior after his initial educa-
37 Robin Cunconan-Lahr. The American With Disabilities 
Act: Educational Implications and Policy Considerations. 
Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Council for 
Exceptional Children, Atlanta, Georgia, 1-5 April 1991, 4, 
Speech, ERIC, ED 333 665. 
38 Pete Idstein. "Swimming Against the Mainstream," Phi 
Delta Kappan 75 (December 1993): 336. 
44 
tional placement. But what about the other 31 students in 
the classroom? They were average children "who form the 
bulk of our student population and who stand without advo-
39 cate in the political arenas of education." Some courts 
40 seem to agree with this opinion. 
Educators aren't arguing with the spirit of IDEA or 
even the letter of the law, but rather with "the cumbersome 
implementation of a law that has magnified the concept of 
due process to the point that it overshadows other school-
based concerns, such as instruction and learning."^ 
The IEP, Parental Participation, and Due Process 
The IEP is an essential component of the IDEA. The IEP 
document defines "appropriate education" based on the unique 
needs of each child with a disability. 
Prior to the passage of the IDEA, school districts made 
decisions with little or no input from the parents and 
the parents had no recourse if they did not like what 
the school district proposed. " 
39Ibid., 337. 
''"-See Roncker on behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 
1058 (6th Cir. 1983), A.W. v. Northwest R-l School District, 
813 F.2d 158 (8th Cir 1987), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 847, 108 
S.Ct. 144, 98 L.Ed.2d 100 (1987). 
^Pete Idstein. "Swimming Against the Mainstream," Phi 
Delta Kappan 75 (December 1993): 337. 
^80 Ed.Law Rep. [711] (April 22, 1993). 
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The IEP is to be developed by a multi-disciplinary team or 
committee which is to include one or both parents or guard­
ians and the disabled child, when appropriate, a representa­
tive of the local education agency (LEA) who is qualified to 
provide or supervise specially designed instruction and the 
teacher. The IEP must include certain components and must 
41 be reviewed annually. 
Parents are to be involved completely in the develop­
ment of their child's IEP. In fact, they are to be involved 
in the entire process of educating their child since they 
usually know their own child better than anyone else does. 
Often, but not always, parents feel that their own 
observations or requests are given little weight and 
that [IEP] decisions are based primarily on the recom­
mendations of the professionals. Their own close 
relationship with the child is viewed as a liability 
rather than as an asset--a liability that renders their 
judgments inherently suspect. 
Provisions of IDEA help strengthen the parents' posi­
tion and guarantees parental involvement in developing an 
"appropriate" individualized education program for their 
child with a disability. Parental involvement also is a way 
to ensure the delivery of these services to their child. 
4320 U.S.C.A. § 1401 ( a) ( 20 ) (1990). 
^David M. Engel, "Law, Culture, and Children with 
Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of 
Difference," Duke Law Journal 1991 (February, 1991): 188. 
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Due process procedures or procedural safeguards are 
important elements of IDEA, "The IDEA provides parents with 
an elaborate grievance procedure in the event they disagree 
with the school district's evaluation findings or recommend­
ed placement."^ These procedural safeguards for the par­
ents of a handicapped child are guaranteed by IDEA.*® The 
47 parents have the right to attend the IEP meeting, and are 
allowed to invite anyone, even an advocate, to attend the 
4ft 
meeting with them. Failure of the LEA in following these 
procedures has led to law suits. "Those rights were includ­
ed within the legislation because Congress intended parents 
to be equal partners in the development of appropriate 
49 educational programs for their children." Parents have 
brought legal action when they disagree with their child's 
IEP and have exhausted all due process procedures. "Failure 
to provide parents with the rights enumerated in the IDEA 
will compromise the school district's position if the case 
should end up in litigation."^ 
4580 Ed.Law Rep. [771] (April 22, 1993). 
4620 U.S.C.A. § 1414 (1990) . 
4?20 U.S.C.A. § 1401 (A) ( 20 ) (1990). 
4834 C.F.R. § 300.345(a) (1990). 
4980 Ed.Law Rep. [771] at 776 (April 22, 1993). 
50Ibid. 
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Summary 
Exclusion from or inclusion in educational programs is 
being tested in court on several different grounds: appro­
priate education, least restrictive environment, violation 
of due process procedure, dispute over appropriate IEP, 
mainstreaming (or appropriate placement) and exclusion based 
on Sec. 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act. 
Historically, at least until 1990, students with dis­
abilities could be and often were excluded from regular 
educational programs. With the changes brought about by the 
civil rights movement and resulting federal legislation, 
rights of disabled students to a free appropriate public 
education have been validated in court. 
In reviewing the recent history of these changing 
rights and entitlements, a free appropriate public education 
in the least restrictive environment for each disabled child 
is a recurrent theme. School officials have tried to accom­
modate children with disabilities by "appropriate" program 
inclusion. Problems arise with the interpretation of such 
terms and concepts as "least restrictive environment," 
mainstreaming, and "free appropriate public education." As 
viewpoints change, litigation becomes more frequent. Feder­
al and state courts are trying to clarify equitably these 
constitutional issues with their recent decisions. 
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CHAPTER III 
ANALYSIS OF STATUTES REGARDING SPECIAL EDUCATION AND 
PROGRAM INCLUSION OR EXCLUSION BASED SOLELY 
ON DISABILITIES 
The United States Constitution states that "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people."* Therefore, the direct 
responsibility for the organization and maintenance of 
public education systems falls to each state. Following the 
passage of a new federal education act, each state may enact 
statutes of its own to meet federal requirements or simply 
adopt the wording of the federal statute. For this reason, 
particular states' statutes will only be discussed if they 
are substantially different from the federal statutes or if 
they exceed standards established in the federal law. 
Federal Statutes 
The first federal legislation addressing the education 
of handicapped children was an amendment to the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89-10) (ESEA), 
passed in 1966 (P.L. 89-750). This amendment was to encour­
age state education leaders to provide and improve programs 
^U.S.Const, amend. X. 
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for handicapped children. It established a series of feder­
al grants to assist individual states in educational pro­
grams and projects for handicapped children. But it did not 
make these programs mandatory. 
Next, Congress passed the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Amendments of 1967 (P.L. 90-247) on January 2, 
1968. One amendment to the ESEA was 
Sec. 154. Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act of 1965 is further amended by adding at 
the end thereof the following new section: 
"Short Title 
"Sec. 615. This title may be cited as the 'Education 
of the Handicapped Act'." 
Thus Title VI of ESEA became the original Education of the 
Handicapped Act (EHA). Yet these amendments still did not 
mandate special education programs; they only strongly 
suggested that programs be created. 
In 1970, Congress repealed the 1966 and 1967 amendments 
to ESEA and passed P.L. 91-230 (The Education of the Handi­
capped Act of 1970). This act also provided federal funding 
in the form of grants. Through the grants process Congress 
wanted to encourage state leaders to develop special educa­
tion programs, resources, and personnel, but Congress didn't 
legislate these programs, yet. 
281 Stat. 804 (1968). 
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"Generally regarded as the first national civil rights 
statute to protect the rights of people with disabling 
conditions, the Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 93-112) was passed 
by Congress in 1973." Any state or local government or 
private organization that receives federal funding is pro­
hibited from discriminating against an "otherwise qualified 
handicapped individual" solely based on the person's dis­
ability. "In both its language and intent it is like other 
federal civil rights laws that prohibit discrimination by 
federal recipients on the basis of race or gender."* 
Section 504 of this statute has had a major impact on 
education. While it was not intended by Congress to be an 
educational statute, § 504 has been much litigated. Several 
of the first education cases used both Brown and Section 504 
as justification for the suits.® The Rehabilitation Act 
3 'H. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va. : The Michie Co., 1985 ) 399. .See 29 U.S.C. § 794 
(1973), and the federal regulations for implementing the law 
at 34 C.F.R. § 104, 
. Rutherford Turnbull III. Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 18. 
5 See, for example, Pennsylvania Association for 
Retarded Children (PARC) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 334 
F.Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Final consent agreement at 343 
F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Also, Mills v. District of Colum­
bia Board of Education, 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), 
Fialkowski v. Shapp, 405 F.Supp 946 (1975) and Frederick L. v. 
Thomas, 419 F.Supp 960 (1976), 557 F.2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1977), 
578 F.2d 513 (1978). 
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was and is intended to be federal anti-discrimination legis­
lation . 
Section 504 applies to all persons with disabilities 
regardless of age. It covers preschool and adult pro­
grams as well as elementary and secondary education, 
requiring equal and accessible transportation, archi­
tecture, educational programs, and nonacademic ser­
vices. Graduation and textbook standards may not be 
discriminatory, nor may evaluation systems. Different 
treatment is justified only if it is necessary to pro­
vide services to persons with disabilities that are as 
effective as those provided to others. 
With the challenge of two landmark special education 
cases, Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children (PARC) 
1 v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Mills v. District of 
0 
Columbia Board of Education and the slow progress of 
states to develop special education programs, Congress 
became extremely disappointed by 1974. The Education Amend­
ments of 1974 (P.L. 93-380) resulted from this disappoint­
ment. Due process protection in the areas of testing, 
identification, placement, record examination, and program 
finance, was extended to parents of handicapped children be-
ERIC/OSEP Special Project. Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, Legal Foundations, Number 1 (Reston, VA: ERIC 
Clearinghouse on Handicapped and Gifted Children, 1992), 2, 
ERIC ED 357 552. 
'334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971), final consent 
agreement, 34 3 F.Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
8348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
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q 
tween the ages of 13 and 21. Federal funding was substan­
tially increased to every state for special education and a 
mandate was given to each state to adopt a goal of providing 
"full educational opportunities to all handicapped children" 
(P.L. 93-380). Congress realized this 1974 law was a provi­
sional measure only and would have to be augmented. It was 
for this very reason that Congress enacted the Education for 
All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142)[EAHCA as 
well as EHA is used when referring to P. L. 94-142. ]*" 
To experts writing at that time, P.L. 94-142 repre­
sented an enforceable civil rights act for exceptional 
children. The new law was intended to make certain 
that handicapped children receive appropriate special 
education and related services. 
P.L. 94-142 created by law several new features. 
School systems were to find and identify handicapped chil­
dren. Programs and related services for handicapped chil­
dren were to be improved, expanded and designed to meet the 
unique needs of each individual child. Handicapped children 
q 
H. C. Hudgxns, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 401-2. 
*®H. Rutherford Turnbull III. Free Appropriate Public-
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 14. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401 
et seq. (1976), and the federal implementing regulations at 34 
C.F.R. § 300. 
. C. Hudgins, and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Educa­
tion: Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottes­
ville, Va.: The Michie Co., 1985) 402. 
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and their parents had the right to procedural due process 
hearing during any phase of the process. These hearing's are 
binding on both parties. The local education agency (LEA) 
educators must advise parents of their rights and the due 
process procedure, how the procedure works and when parents 
can ask for and get a hearing. Before this time, local 
educators appeared to adhere to the principle of "what 
parents don't know, we aren't going to tell them because it 
will help us in the long run." If parents didn't know their 
rights or what services were available, the LEA didn't have 
to provide these services. This attitude leads to exclusion 
of disabled children by omission. 
The individualized education program (IEP) process was 
another provision of EAHCA. An appropriate IEP must be 
designed to meet each child's unique needs and must be 
reevaluated annually. 
The 1975 law [the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act] was the most significant amendment of the 
Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) to that time. 
But it has not been the only amendment. Congress has 
amended the EHA in 1978 by P.L. 95-561, in 1983 by P.L. 
98-199, in 1986 by P.L. 99-372 [the Handicapped 
Children's Protection Act], and again in 1986 by P.L. 
99-457.1 the Handicapped Infants and Toddlers Act - Part 
H-EHA] " 
10 
"H. Rutherford Turnbull III. Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 14. 
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In 1990, Congress passed P.L. 101-336 (The Americans 
with Disabilities Act or ADA) and P.L. 101-476 (The Individ­
uals with Disabilities Education Act or IDEA). The IDEA 
amended the EHA and changed its name. The ADA is modeled 
after the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
The protection from discrimination that was provided in 
federally funded activities by Title V of the Vocation­
al Rehabilitation Act [of 1973] was extended to pri­
vate-sector and state and local governments activities 
by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 
ADA is composed of five titles. Title I deals with 
employment and affects employers with 15 or more employees. 
Employers may not discriminate against otherwise qualified 
applicants with disabilities. Reasonable accommodations 
must be made for applicants or employees with disabilities 
unless undue hardship would be caused. The U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission administers this title.^ 
Title II deals with public services such provided by as 
state and local governments. This title affects facility 
accessibility of both existing and new construction and 
transportation vehicles. Facilities must meet accessibility 
requirements consistent with section 504 of the Rehabilita-
^ERIC/OSEP Special Project. Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, Legal Foundations, Number 1 (Reston, VA: ERIC 
Clearinghouse on Handicapped and Gifted Children, 1992), 3, 
ERIC ED 357 552. 
HIbid. 
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tion Act of 1973. New transportation vehicles must be 
accessible to disabled individuals. Administration of Title 
II falls on the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. 
Department of Transportation. 
Of the five titles, Title III has the greatest rele­
vance to public elementary and secondary education and it 
extends concerns from public to private agencies. In its 
entirety, Title III states: 
Title III: Public Accommodations. Privately 
owned public accommodations such as restaurants, ho­
tels, theaters, stores, doctors' offices, parks, pri­
vate schools, and day-care centers may not discriminate 
on the basis of disability. Physical barriers must be 
removed if removal is readily achievable; otherwise, 
alternative methods of providing services must be 
offered. New constructions and alterations to existing 
constructions must be accessible. . , .New buses and 
other vehicles operated by private entities must be 
accessible or the system must provide service equiva­
lent to that provided to the general public. Lead 
agencies for Title II are the U.S. Department of Jus­
tice and the U.S. Department of Transportation. 
Title IV deals with telecommunications. "Telephone 
companies must provide telecommunications relay services for 
hearing impaired and speech impaired persons 24 hours per 
17 day." Implementation will be the responsibility of the 
Federal Communications Commission. 
15Ibid, 4. 
I6Ibid. 
17Ibid. 
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Title V covers many miscellaneous issues from insurance 
regulations to the implementation of each title. It also 
contains amendments to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
The ADA is patterned after the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 and specifically section 504. "This Act served as the 
model for much of the language found in the ADA. However, 
the Rehabilitation Act only applies to recipients of federal 
1 8 funds; the ADA covers many more employers." ADA has 
extensive ramification for students with disabilities. 
On behalf of students with disabilities, the ADA 
challenges educators and policymakers to renew the 
spirit that was prevalent during Brown v. Board of 
Education of Topeka and at the time of the development 
of EAHCA to ensure maximum opportunities for inclusive 
citizenship. 
The IDEA has eight parts and includes past legislation 
such as P.L. 94-142. Several highlights of the 1990 amend­
ments are: the creation of the Office of Special Education 
Programs (OSEP) in the U.S. Department of Education, the 
inclusion of transition services in IEPs beginning at age 
16, and the provision of grants in excess of $2 billion per 
1 8  Stephen Allred. "The Americans with Disabilities Act: 
Some Questions and Answers." School Law Bulletin 22 (Winter 
1991): 6. 
19 Robin Cunconan-Lahr. The American With Disabilities 
Act: Educational Implications and Policy Considerations. 
Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Council for 
Exceptional Children, Atlanta, Georgia, 1-5 April 1991, 5, 
Speech, ERIC, ED 333 665. 
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year to state and local educational agencies to help under­
write the cost of educating children with disabilities. 
IDEA, formerly the Education of the Handicapped 
Act (EHA), is the comprehensive law articulating feder­
al policy concerning the education of and early inter­
vention for infants, toddlers, children and youth with 
disabilit ies. 
The IDEA also extended and clarified the elements 
necessary in every IEP. Each IEP must be a written state­
ment and include at least the following elements: 
(A) a statement of the present levels of educational 
performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual 
goals, including short-term instructional objectives, 
(C) a statement of the specific educational services to 
be provided to such child, and the extent to which such 
child will be able to participate in regular education­
al programs, (D) a statement of the needed transition 
services for students beginning no later than age 16 
and annually thereafter (and, when determined appropri­
ate for the individual, beginning at age 14 or youn­
ger), including, when appropriate, a statement of the 
interagency responsibilities or linkage (or both) 
before the student leaves the school setting, (E) the 
projected date for initiation and anticipated duration 
of such services, and (F) appropriate objective crite­
ria and evaluation procedures and schedules for deter­
mining, on at least an annual basis whether instruc­
tional objectives are being achieved. 
ERIC/OSEP Special Project. The Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Legal Foundations, Number 
2 (Reston, VA: ERIC Clearinghouse on Handicapped and Gifted 
Children, 1992), 1, ERIC ED 357 553. 
2I20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a) (20) (1990). 
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The parents of the handicapped child are to be included in 
the development of the IEP. The IDEA provided parents with 
the guarantee of procedural due process. 
The intent of the law [IDEA] was to guarantee these 
students an appropriate education in the least restric­
tive environment. The law was unique in that it pro­
vided students, and their parents, with substantial 
procedural due process rights to ensure that the in­
tended appropriate education became a reality. 
State Statutes 
The only state statutes that will be discussed are from 
states that have enacted statutes with higher standards than 
the IDEA. To qualify for and receive funding under IDEA, a 
state must have statutes in effect "that assure all children 
with disabilities the right to a free appropriate public 
23 education" "which emphasizes special education and relat-
ed services designed to meet their unique needs."" 
The federal Act provides the minimum requirements for pro­
viding a free appropriate public education. 
There were substantial differences among some different 
state statutes. Most states enacted similar statutes in 
response to the original federal legislation, The Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-142), 
2280 Ed. Law Rep. [771] (April 22, 1993). 
2320 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1) (West 1994). 
2420 U.S.C.A. § 1400(c) (West 1994). 
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passed in 1975. Then Congress passed the 1990 amendments 
(IDEA). Consequently, the wording of the state statutes did 
not mirror the new federal verbiage. States that didn't 
have equivalent statutes again wrote their statutes to 
parallel the 1990 federal verbiage and intent. Indeed, some 
states amended their statutes to match the exact wording of 
25 the federal legislation. In fact, 45 states now have 
statutes with parallel or exact wording to IDEA or the court 
has ruled that the statutes do not exceed the federal stat­
utes. However, five states still have statutes using lan­
guage that exceeds the federal requirements for a "free 
appropriate public education" by the use of words such as 
"full" or "maximize" when referring to the potential or 
capabilities of a disabled child. This difference in word­
ing and therefore intent is causing legal problems for 
several of these states. The courts must decide if par­
ticular state statutes exceed the federal requirements and 
therefore must be considered in a ruling (see Table 1). 
^California Education Codes § 56000 (Deering Supp. 
1994) states "It is also the intent of the Legislature that 
nothing in this part shall be construed to set a higher 
standard of educating individuals with exceptional needs than 
that established by Congress under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act." 
Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 293 S.E.2d 687, 
appeal dismissed, 295 S.E.2d 759 (1982), Scituate School 
Committee v. Robert B., 620 F.Supp. 1224 (D.C.R.I. 1985), 
aff'd 795 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1986), Conklin v. Bd. of Educa­
tion, 946 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991), Doe v. Board of Education 
of Tullahoma, 9 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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Table 1 
Comparison of Phrasing of State Statutes and IDEA 
Same as exceeds Same as exceeds 
State the IDEA IDEA State the IDEA IDEA 
Alabama XXX Montana XXX 
Alaska XXX Nebraska XXX 
Arizona XXX Nevada XXX 
Arkansas XXX(a) New Hampshire XXX 
California XXX New Jersey XXX(b) 
Colorado XXX New Mexico XXX 
Connecticut XXX New York XXX 
Delaware XXX North Carolina XXX(c) 
Florida XXX North Dakota XXX 
Georgia XXX Ohio XXX 
Hawaii XXX Oklahoma XXX 
Idaho XXX(d) Oregon XXX 
Illinois XXX Pennsylvania XXX 
Indiana XXX Rhode Island XXX(e) 
Iowa XXX(f) South Carolina XXX 
Kansas XXX(g) South Dakota XXX 
Kentucky XXX Tennessee XXX(h) 
Louisiana XXX Texas XXX 
Maine XXX Utah XXX 
Maryland XXX(i) Vermont XXX 
Massachusetts XXX(j) Virginia XXX 
Michigan XXX(k) Washington XXX 
Minnesota XXX West Virginia XXX 
Mississippi XXX Wisconsin XXX 
Missouri XXX(l) Wyoming XXX 
(a)The original wording, "to meet the needs to maximize the 
capabilities of handicapped children," was amended in 1990 to parallel 
IDEA. (b)The wording of the 1978 Statutes exceeded IDEA. This wording 
was amended to parallel to IDEA by 1993. (c)While the wording exceeds 
IDEA, the court has ruled the intent does not exceed the intent of IDEA. 
(d)The statute as written in 1981 used the words "fullest potential". 
Statute was amended by 1993 to exactly match IDEA. (e)Court has ruled 
Statute did not exceed IDEA regardless of wording. (f)Statue was 
amended to match IDEA in 1985. (g)Statute uses the phrase "progress 
toward the maximum of their abilities or capacities." This definition 
has not been challenged in court as of June, 1994. (h)Court ruled that 
Statute does not exceed IDEA regard-less of wording. (i)Definition has 
been challenged in court, but no clear decision has been handed down. 
(j)Statute has been challenged in court twice. Both times, the court 
used the state statute in deciding the cases. (k)The statute states "to 
develop the maximum potential of every handicapped person. It hasn't 
really been tested in court regarding the term "maximum." (l)While the 
phrasing of the statute exceeds IDEA, it has not been challenged in 
court as of June, 1994. 
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In the Arkansas Code of 1987 Annotated the original 
wording "to meet the needs to maximize the capabilities of 
27 handicapped children"(emphasis added) has been changed to 
"[i]t shall be the policy of this state to provide ... a 
free appropriate public education for students with disabil-
ities."" Now, the wording is identical to the federal 
statute. 
The Idaho Code originally defined exceptional children 
using the phrase "as to require special education and spe­
cial services in order to develop to their fullest capaci-
29 ty." This wording has been dropped from the current 
definition of exceptional children. The definition of 
special education or special instructional services was 
added to include "specially designed instruction or related 
services at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs 
111 of an exceptional child." This now exactly parallels the 
federal wording. 
On the other hand, in 1985 Iowa amended its original 
statutes from ". . .To meet the needs and maximize the 
capabilities of children requiring special education" to 
"[i]t is the policy of this state. . . to provide . . . for 
^Ark. Code Ann. § 6-41-202 (Michie 1989). 
^Ark. Code Ann. § 6-41-202(a) (Michie 1993). 
29Idaho Code § 33-2002 (Bobbs-Merrill 1981). 
^Idaho Code §33-2001(5) (Michie Supp. 1994). 
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a free and appropriate public education sufficient to meet 
the needs of all children requiring special education."3* 
The Kansas Statutes Annotated adds a new dimension to 
the definition of "exceptional children" 
(f) "Exceptional children" means persons who: (1) are 
school age, . . and (2) differ in physical, mental, 
social, emotional or educational characteristics to the 
extent that special education services are necessary to 
enable them to progress toward the maximum of their 
abilities or capacities. 
Their definition of special education services simply states 
"programs for which specialized training, instruction, 
programming techniques, facilities and equipment may be 
needed for the education of exceptional children." 
The wording of this statute hasn't been challenged in court, 
yet. If the statute is challenged, it will be interesting 
to see if a court focuses on "progress toward" or "maximum" 
in the wording. 
The Maryland statutes define special educational ser­
vices as meaning: 
the educational services necessary to assure that all 
handicapped children are given the opportunity to reach 
3*Iowa Code Ann. §281.2(3) (West 1988). 
32Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-962(f) (1992 ). 
33Kan. Stat. Ann. § 72-962(h) ( 1992). 
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appropriate levels of knowledge and learning skills 
consistent with their potential. 
r 
This statute has been challenged in court. The Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the case to the distinct 
court to decide if the Maryland statute exceeds the federal 
Act. No clear-cut decision had been made as of June, 1994. 
The Massachusetts statute has an unique wording among 
the other states including "to minimize the possibility of 
stigmatization and to assure the maximum possible develop­
ment in the least restrictive environment of a child with 
0 j? 
special needs."(emphasis added) This Massachusetts stat­
ute has been challenged in court twice. In each case, the 
court considered the wording and intent of the state statute 
31 over the IDEA. The first case was decided in favor of 
the parents. The school system was required to educate a 
child with Down's Syndrome in a private residential school. 
In the second challenge, the court ruled for the school 
district stating that both the IEP developed and the public 
school educational placement recommended by the school 
^Md. Code Ann, Educ. §8-401(a)(2) (Michie 1992). 
35 Conklin v. Board of Education of Anne Arundell 
County, 946 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1991). 
^Mass, Ann. Laws ch. 71B, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1994). 
^David D. v. Dartmouth School Committee, 775 F.2d 411 
(1st Cir. 1985 ) . 
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district would maximize the child's development in the least 
38 restrictive environment. 
The Michigan statute defines a state plan "which shall 
provide for the delivery of special education programs and 
services designed to develop the maximum potential of every 
39 handicapped person." This statute has been tested in 
court only to the extent of deciding between two equal but 
different programs for a handicapped child. Both programs 
would help the child develop to his/her maximum potential; 
therefore, the court ruled in favor of the less expensive 
program.^ 
Missouri statutes require special education services 
"sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the capabilities 
of handicapped and severely handicapped children."^ This 
statute apparently hasn't been challenged in any state or 
federal court as of 1994. 
North Carolina statutes are very explicit in the spe­
cial education policy statement "to ensure every child a 
Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, 910 F.2d 983 
(1st Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 912 (1991). 
39Mich. Stat. Ann. § 15.41701(a) (Callaghan 1987). 
40Mich. Stat. Ann. § 15.41701 note 12 (Callaghan 1987). 
See Chuhran v. Walled Lake Consolidated Schools, 839 F.Supp. 
465 (E.D. Mich. 1993). 
4IMo. Ann. Stat. § 162.670 (Vernon 1991). 
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fair and full opportunity to reach his full potent ial. 1,42 
The case notes for this section make a revealing statement 
regarding the North Carolina Statute: 
This section was not designed to require the develop­
ment of a Utopian educational program for handicapped 
students any more than the public schools are required • 
to provide a Utopian educational program for nonhandi-
capped students. Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, 58 
N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687, cert, denied and appeal 
dismissed, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E.2d 759 (1982).43 
New Jersey original statutes state that "a local public 
school district must provide each handicapped pupil a spe­
cial education and services according to how the pupil can 
best achieve educational success."^ The wording of the 
it, 
recent New Jersey Statutes Annotated parallels the fed­
eral statutes. These changes may be the result of a court 
46 case. 
The Rhode Island statute exceeds the federal wording in 
one area stating that the school committee "shall provide 
the type of special education that will best satisfy the 
42N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-106(a) (Michie 1993). 
4^N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C-106 case note (Michie 1993). 
44N.J. Admin. Code Title 6 § 28-2.1 to 2.2 (1978). 
45N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:46-19.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 
1993). 
46 See Geis v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, Morris County, 589 F.Supp 269,272 (D.N.J. 1984), 774 F. 
2d. 575 ( 3rd Cir. 1985 ) . 
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j n 
needs of the handicapped child." In the case of Scit-uate 
t Q 
School Committee v. Robert B., the court found that the 
Rhode Island statute did not impose a substantive standard 
higher than the federal mandate for a free appropriate 
public education. The difference in wording of the statute 
i A 
was taken into consideration by the court. 
The Tennessee statute, in its legislative intent, 
maintains that the state will "provide special education 
services sufficient to meet the needs and maximize the 
capabilities of handicapped children."^ Yet, the defini­
tion of "special education services" only states "to meet 
the needs of handicapped children."5* In the only case to 
challenge the wording of the Tennessee statute, the appel­
late court ruled that Tennessee's special education statute 
did not impose a standard higher than established by the 
IDEA.52 
47R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-24-1 (Michie 1988). 
48620 F.Supp. 1224 (D.R.I. 1985), aff'd, 795 F.2d 77 
(1st Cir. 1986). 
49Ibid., 1233. 
^®Tenn. Code Ann. §49-10-101 ( a)(1) (Michie 1990). 
5iTenn. Code Ann. §49-10-102(4) (Michie 1993). 
52 Doe v. Board of Education of Tullahoma City Schools, 
9 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 1993 ) . 
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Summary 
Evidently, most state legislatures have decided to 
safeguard their school systems from legal proceedings by 
exactly matching or paralleling the language of the IDEA in 
their state statutes. This may be the better part of dis­
cretion. As of June, 1994, only five states still have 
wording that exceeds the federal substantive standards. The 
other states have either changed the wording of the statutes 
to parallel the federal mandate or the courts have decreed 
that the intent is the same, even if the wording is not. As 
Chapter IV will show, few cases involve the difference in 
wording between state and federal statutes. The majority of 
case law deals exclusively with violations of federal stat­
utes . 
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CHAPTER IV 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF SPECIAL EDUCATION WITH RESPECT TO PUBLIC 
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL PROGRAM INCLUSION OR 
EXCLUSION BASED SOLELY ON DISABILITIES 
Educational program exclusion or inclusion solely based 
on a disability has become a much litigated area since the 
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka' 
and the passage of Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) 
and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act (P.L. 93-112). The 
courts have been asked to clarify both constitutional and 
statutory issues in many cases. Of all the education cases 
litigated only a few have been heard by the United States 
Supreme Court. For this reason, federal courts of appeal 
and state supreme courts have been forced to make landmark 
rulings. The legal cases considered in this analysis are 
from 1978 through December, 1993. 
The facts in each case are examined. The final deci­
sion of the court is discussed. Legal ramifications of the 
case and the effects on public school administrators and/or 
school policy are included. 
Exclusion from or inclusion in education programs is 
currently being tested in court on several different 
grounds: free appropriate public education, least restric-
*347 U.S. 483, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). 
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tive environment, violation of due process procedure, dis­
pute over Individual Education Programs (IEP), 
mainstreaming, appropriate placement, exclusion based on 
Sec. 504 of the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, and the 
definition of related services under IDEA. Because each 
case usually has more than one factor or legal issue, each 
case is put into a category based on the major issue. The 
cases are divided into five categories: 1) landmark cases, 
2) free appropriate public education, 3) due process, 4) 
exclusion and 5) IEP, mainstreaming, and parental participa­
tion. The cases are reviewed in chronological order within 
each section. 
Landmark Cases 
Landmark cases are presented first because the court 
findings and decisions in these cases are cited, in one form 
or another, in other cases discussed in this study. 
In the now landmark case, Board of Education of the 
9 
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, the 
United States Supreme Court had its first litigation dealing 
with statutory interpretation of the Education for All 
Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (EAHCA). In particular, 
the Act's directive that "appropriate education" be afforded 
every child eligible under the Act needed to be clarified. 
2458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). 
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Amy Rowley, a hearing-impaired student with minimal 
residual hearing, was enrolled in regular classes since 
kindergarten. She received help from a tutor for one hour 
every day and a speech therapist three hours each week. Her 
parents requested the additional services of a sign-language 
interpreter. The parents felt that the additional service 
of an interpreter would enable Amy to develop to her maximum 
potential. School administrators challenged whether this 
service was necessary because Amy had passed each grade with 
above average grades. An impartial hearing officer found 
that the sign-language interpreter was not necessary. The 
parents brought suit in the U.S. District Court. The Dis­
trict Court found for the parents stating: 
Entering judgement for the respondents, the District 
Court found that although the child performed better 
than the average child in her class and was advancing 
easily from grade to grade, she was not performing as 
well academically as she would without her handicap. 
Because of this disparity between the child's achieve­
ment and her potential, the court held that she was not 
receiving a "free appropriate public education," which 
the court defined as "an opportunity to achieve [her] 
full potential commensurate with the opportunity pro­
vided to other children." The Court of Appeals af­
firmed . 
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of 
Appeals ruling. The Court found that "in seeking to provide 
3Ibid., 3039-40. 
4458 U.S. 176 ( 1982) . 
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such access to public education, Congress did not impose 
upon the States any greater substantive educational standard 
than would be necessary to make such access meaningful."^ 
The Court stated in part: 
Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing 
access to a "free appropriate public education" is the 
requirement that the education to which access is 
provided be sufficient to confer some educational 
benefit upon the handicapped child. . . .We therefore 
conclude that the "basic floor of opportunity" provided 
by the Act consists of access to specialized instruc­
tion and related services which are individually de­
signed to provide educational benefit to the handi­
capped child (emphasis added). 
The Court determined that Congress did not mean for schools 
to try to educate handicapped students to their maximum 
potential. According to the EHA, schools only have to 
provide the disabled child with the same basic opportunities 
for an education as nonhandicapped children. Educators do 
not have to provide an education that enables a disabled 
child to reach his maximum potential. 
This is a landmark case for another reason. In con­
sidering appropriate methodologies, the Court maintained: 
5458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982) . 
6458 U.S. 176, 200-201. 
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In assuring that the requirements of the act have 
been met, courts must be careful to avoid imposing 
their view of preferable educational methods upon the 
States. The primary responsibility for formulating the 
education to be accorded a handicapped child, and for 
choosing the educational method most suitable to the 
child's needs, was left by the Act to state and local 
educational agencies in cooperation with the parents or 
guardian of the child. . -. . [I]t seems highly unlikely 
that Congress intended courts to overturn a State's 
choice of appropriate educational theories in a pro­
ceeding conducted pursuant to §1415(e)(2). 
We previously have cautioned that courts lack the 
"specialized knowledge and experience" necessary to 
resolve "persistent and difficult questions of educa­
tional policy."San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S., at 42. We think that Congress 
shared that view when it passed the Act. . . . There­
fore, once a court determines that the requirements of 
the Act have been met, questions of methodology are for 
resolution by the States. 
These two principles have been used as the basis for numer­
ous rulings made by other courts. 
0 
Two additional landmark cases, Smith v. Robinson and 
Q 
Irving' Independent School District v. Tatro, were decided 
by the United States Supreme Court the same day, July 5, 
1984. Since Smith was argued first, it is presumed to 
precede Tatro. Also Smith is cited in the Court's ruling on 
Tatro. 
7458 U.S. 176, 207-08. 
8703 F. 2d 4, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 79 L.Ed.2d 
304. (1984). 
9468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664 (1984). 
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The case of Smith v. Robinson^ is extremely compli­
cated and includes several different legal issues. 
The [major] issue in Smith was whether a student 
may sue under the EHA, Section 504, and Section 1983 
where the alleged discrimination is prohibited under 
EHA; that is, may the student use Section 504 and 
Section 1983 to enforce a right already granted by the 
EHA and, if successful, recover attorneys' fees? 
Thomas F. Smith III suffered from cerebral palsy and a vari­
ety of physical and emotional handicaps. Tommy was eight 
years old in November, 1976. In December 1975, he was 
initially placed by the Cumberland School Committee in a day 
program at a hospital in East Providence, R.I. In November 
1976, the parents were informed by the Superintendent of 
Schools that the School Committee would no longer fund the 
child's placement in a special education program. The 
committee decided that according to Rhode Island law, the 
State's Division of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospi­
tals (MHRH) was responsible for educating an emotionally 
disturbed child. The parents began the due process proce­
dure and brought suit in Federal District Court. 
They asserted, at various points in the proceedings, 
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief based on 
107O3 F.2d 4, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 79 L.Ed.2d 
304. (1984). 
^H. Rutherford Turnbull III. Free Appropriate Public-
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 228. 
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state law, on the Education of the Handicapped Act 
(EHA), on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and, 
with respect to certain federal constitutional claims, 
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
During this process, the Associate Commissioner of Education 
acknowledged the parents' contention that a state statute 
was in conflict with the EHA. The state statute concerning 
MHRH required the parents to pay a portion of the cost for 
providing services to their son. The district court stated 
". . . the child was entitled, as a matter of state law, to 
a free appropriate special education paid for by the School 
I 3 Committee." In addition, the Court found . . it was 
therefore unnecessary and improper to reach petitioners' 
federal statutory and constitutional claims."'^ 
The parents also were requesting attorney fees be paid 
by the school committee and the state defendants. The 
school committee agreed to pay certain attorney fees. The 
district court also granted certain fees associated with the 
administrative process because parents are obligated "to 
exhaust their EHA remedies before asserting their § 1983 and 
1 1 
§ 504 claims." The First Circuit Court of Appeals re­
versed this decision, concluding ". . . the action and 
12468 U.S. 992 [Syllabus] (1984). 
13Ibid. 
HIbid. 
15Ibid. 
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relief granted fell within the reach of the EH A, but the 
EHA does not grant attorney's fees. The appellate court 
concluded that "Congress could not have intended its omis­
sion of attorney's fees relief in that statute [EHA] to be 
rectified by recourse to § 1988. The United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
We have little difficulty concluding that Congress 
intended the EHA to be the exclusive avenue through 
which a plaintiff may assert an equal claim to a Rub-
licly financed special education.[Emphasis added] 
This case is cited often when a case has both EHA issues and 
§ 504 issues to be decided. "Its [the Supreme Court] 1984 
decision in Smith v. Robinson specifically side-stepped the 
damages question, but contained language suggesting that the 
19 Court will.rule consistent with the majority trend." 
The important implication to educators is that EHA issues 
take precedence over Section 504 or Section 1983 claims. 
A third landmark case, Irving Independent School Dis-
trict v. Tatro," addresses "related services" required 
ieibid. 
17Ibid. 
18468 U.S. 992, 1069. 
^H. Rutherford Turnbull III. Free Appropriate Public 
Education: The Law and Children with Disabilities (Denver, 
CO: Love Publishing Co., 1990), 229. 
2l,468 U.S. 883, 104 S.Ct. 3371, 82 L.Ed.2d 664 ( 1984). 
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under EHA. The U.S. Supreme Court in 1983 considered two 
separate issues in this case: 1) is clean intermittent 
catheterization (CIC) a "related service" under the EHA? and 
2) is a § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act claim applicable, 
2 1  including' attorney's fees? 
Amber Tatro was an 8-year-old girl born with spina 
bifida. She suffered from orthopedic and speech impairments 
and has a neurogenic bladder, which prevents voluntary 
voiding of the bladder. To prevent damage to her kidneys, 
99 Amber had to be catheterized every three or four hours. 
The procedure called clean intermittent catheterization 
(CIC) was prescribed by her physician. 
CIC involves the insertion of a catheter into the 
urethra to drain the bladder. The procedure isn't difficult 
and can be performed by a layperson with less than one hour 
of training. In fact Amber's parents, older brother and 
babysitter were all trained in the procedure that only takes 
a few minutes. Amber could have performed this procedure 
23 herself if she were older. 
The parents maintained that CIC was a "related service" 
and should be provided by the school district. Without this 
service, Amber could not attend school. This, in effect, 
21Ibid., 884. 
22Ibid., 885. 
23Ibid. 
excluded Amber from school solely based on her disability. 
The school district contended that CIC was a "medical ser­
vice," not a "related service" as defined in EHA. There­
fore, the school district should be excluded from having to 
provide this services for her. 
Amber was to attend a public pre-school program begin­
ning in 1979 when she was three and a half-years old. The 
initial IEP developed provided Amber with special services 
including physical and occupational therapy, but made no 
provision for CIC by school personnel. The parents dis­
agreed and asked for procedural due process hearing. A 
hearing officex- ruled for the parents and was upheld by the 
Texas Commissioner of Education. The ruling was reversed by 
the State Board of Education. The parents brought suit in 
United States District Court. The district court initially 
ruled in favor of the school district. The parents 
appealed. The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed this ruling and remanded the case. On remand, the 
district court found for the parents. In addition, the 
court awarded compensatory damages under § 504 of the Reha­
bilitation Act. 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that states receiving 
funding through EHA must provide a "free appropriate public 
education" which is defined as "special education and relat-
78 
9 J 
ed services"" The Court referred to the EHA definition of 
related services: 
transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and 
other supportive services (including speech pathology 
and audiology, psychological services, physical and 
occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and 
counseling services, except that such medical services 
shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) 
as may be required to assist a handicapped child to 
benefit from special education, and includes the early 
identification and assessment of handicapping condi­
tions in children. § 1401(17)(emphasis added). 
The Court's opinion was that CIC is a "related service" 
under EHA because it enabled Amber to remain at school. It 
was not a "medical service," but a "school health service," 
34 C.F.R. §300.13(a) (1983 )2b' which was defined as "servic­
es provided by a qualified school nurse or other qualified 
person," §300.13(b)(10) ( 1983 ).The Court clarified the 
issue further stating: 
only those services necessary to aid a handicapped 
child to benefit from special education must be provid­
ed, regardless how easily a school nurse or layperson 
could furnish them. For example, if a particular medi­
cation or treatment inay appropriately be administered 
to a handicapped child other than during the school 
day, a school is not required to provide nursing ser­
vices to administer it. . . .[T]he regulations state 
that school nursing services must be provided only if 
2420 U.S.C.A. § 1401( 18) (1990). 
25 4 6 8 U.S. 883, 889-890. 
26Ibid., 892. 
27Ibid. 
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they can be performed by a nurse or other qualified 
person, not if they must be performed by a 
phys ician. 
If the service required a physician, it would be excluded as 
a "medical service." Since CIC doesn't require a nurse or a 
physician to preform the procedure, it must be provided by 
the school district. 
On the issue of relief under § 504 of the Rehabilita-
pq 
tion Act, the Court citing Smith v. Robinson stated 
"§ 504 is inapplicable when relief is available under the 
Education of the Handicapped Act to remedy a denial of 
10 educational services." The Court held that the parents 
were not entitled to relief under § 504 and reversed this 
part of the appellate court decision. 
In the landmark case of Burlington School Committee v. 
•H 
Massachusetts Department of Education, the Town of 
Burlington (Town) brought suit against the Massachusetts 
Department of Education's Bureau of Special Education Ap­
peals (BSEA) and the parents of a learning disabled child 
over a decision about educational placement and reimburse­
ment of private school expenses. By the time this case 
28Ibid., 894. 
29 4 6 8 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 79 L.Ed.2d 304. (1984). 
30 4 6 8 U.S. 883, 895. 
31471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 ( 1985). 
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reached the United States Supreme Court, Mr. and Mrs. Panico 
and Town had been negotiating this case for over eight 
years. Therefore, only the issues that the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari will be discussed. 
Michael Panico, originally referred to as John Doe, Jr. 
in the earlier cases, was a learning disabled child. He 
began having serious academic trouble in the first grade. 
He was later identified as "handicapped" under the EHA. 
"This entitled him to receive at public expense specially 
designed instruction to meet his unique needs, as well as 
related transportation. §§1401(16), 1401(17)."^ 
The IEP developed for Michael for the 1978-79 academic 
year called for one hour of reading tutoring per day and 
counseling. The school Michael attended was not staffed to 
serve his needs. He continued to perform poorly. These 
factors led to extensive discussion between the school and 
the parents. These discussions were not always amicable. 
Both the Town and parents agreed that Michael had an above 
average to superior intelligence, but needed to be in a 
different school for the 1879-80 academic year. There was 
much disagreement over the type and origin of Michael's 
disability. The Town said that the source was emotional and 
the parents believed it to be neurological. Based on the 
results of an independent evaluation, the parents withdrew 
32Ibid., 361. 
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Michael from public school and enrolled him in a state-
approved private school. The evaluation found that Michael 
had a severe learning disorder and should be placed in a 
private school-type setting that specialized in learning 
handicaps. Mr. Panico rejected the proposed IEP for the 
1979-1980 academic year and requested a hearing. 
The hearing officer found Michael's placement in the 
private school was appropriate and ordered the Town to 
reimburse the parents for tuition, transportation and ex­
penses. The Town brought suit in district court. The 
district court granted summary judgment against the Town. 
The Town appealed. The appellate court vacated the judgment 
and remanded the case. On remand, the district court found 
for the Town, stating that the Town was not responsible for 
tuition for academic years 1979-80 through 1981-82. The 
parents appealed again. The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
34 remanded the case again. 
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the findings 
of the appellate court: 
1. The grant of authority to reviewing court under 
§1415(e)(2) includes the power to order school authori­
ties to reimburse parents for their expenditures on 
private special education for a child if the court 
ultimately determines that such placement, rather than 
a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act. The ordinary 
33Ibid., 362. 
3*Ibid., 362-64. 
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meaning of the language in §1415(e)(2) directing the 
court to 'grant such relief as [it] determines is 
appropriate' confers broad discretion on the court. To 
deny such reimbursement would mean that the child's 
right to a free appropriate public education, the 
parents' right to participate fully in developing a 
proper IEP, and all of the procedural safeguards of the 
Act would be less than complete. Pp. 369-371. 
2. A parental violation of §1415(e)(3) by changing the 
'then current educational placement' of their child 
during the pendency of proceedings to review a chal­
lenged proposed IEP does not constitute a waiver of 
parents' right to reimbursement for expenses of the 
private placement. Otherwise, the parents would be 
forced to leave the child in what may turn out to be an 
inappropriate educational placement or to obtain the 
appropriate placement only by sacrificing any claim for 
reimbursement. But if the courts ultimately determine 
that the proposed IEP was appropriate, the parents 
would be barred from obtaining reimbursement for any 
interim period in which their child's placement violat­
ed §1415(e)(3). Pp. 371-374. " 
The two prerequisites to reimbursement as interpreted by the 
Court are: 1) Did the educational program proposed by the 
school district fail to provide a free appropriate public 
education for the child? and 2) Did the private school 
chosen by the parents provide an appropriate education, 
allowing the child to receive reasonable educational bene­
fits from it? 
0 J? 
The landmark case, Honig v. Doe, addresses the 
"stay-put" provision of the EHA as it applies to expulsion 
35Ibid. , 360. 
36484 U.S. 305, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988). 
The original case was Doe by Gonzales v. Maher, 793 F.2d 1470 
(9th Cir. 1986 ) . 
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of disabled children, especially emotionally handicapped. 
This provision requires that a disabled child shall remain 
in the current educational placement until the procedural 
review proceedings are completed. 
By the time the United States Supreme Court granted the 
writ of certiorari, the case in regard to John Doe was moot 
because he was then 24 years old and no longer eligible 
under the EHA. The Act limits eligibility to disabled 
children between the ages of 3 and 21. The case was justi­
ciable in respect to Jack Smith because he was only 20 years 
07 
old and had not finished high school yet. 
John Doe and Jack Smith were emotionally disturbed 
students. They attended schools in the San Francisco Uni­
fied School District (SFUSD). SFUSD officials tried to 
expel both students for violent and disruptive behavior 
related to their disabilities. 
Both students had exhibited violent or disruptive 
behavior in the respective schools. They were suspended for 
five days and recommendations to expel them permanently were 
made to School Placement Committees. Both suspensions were 
extended indefinitely. Doe brought legal proceedings first 
and Smith later intervened. 
The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of California granted summary judgment for the 
37484 U.S. 305 (1988) . 
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students. The judge held in a series of decisions that the 
proposed expulsions and indefinite suspensions for disabili-
ty-related conduct violated their EHA rights to a FAPE and 
due process, and 1) permanently enjoined the school district 
from taking disciplinary action other than a two or five day 
suspension for any disability-related misconduct by any 
disabled child, 2) enjoined the school district from execut­
ing any change in educational placement without parental 
consent until completion of EHA proceedings, and 3) 
ordered, if it was determined in an individual case that a 
local education agency was unable or unwilling to provide 
direct services to disabled children, the State must provide 
0 0 
services directly to disabled children. 
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
orders with slight modifications. The appellate court ruled 
that the 1983 amendments to the California Education Code 
that authorized initial suspensions of 20 days and up to 30 
days in special cases "did not fall within the reach of 
§ 1415(e)(3)[of EHA], and therefore upheld such suspen-
39 sions." A writ of certiorari was filed. 
As previously stated, the United States Supreme Court 
found the case concerning John Doe to be moot because of his 
age. The Court did consider the case with respect to Jack 
38Ibid., 315-16. 
39Ibid. 
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Smith since he was still eligible under the EHA. The Court 
considered the "stay-put" provision of EHA which states: 
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursu­
ant to this section, unless the State or local educa­
tional agency and the parents or guardian otherwise 
agree, the child shall remain in the then current 
educational placement of such child, or, if applying 
for initial admission to a public school, shall, with 
the consent of parents or guardian, be placed in the 
public school program until such proceedings have been 
completed. 
This provision forbids state or local school authorities 
"from unilaterally excluding disabled students from the 
classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct growing out of 
their disabilities"^ during the continuance of review pro­
ceedings. The Court held that "Congress did not leave 
school administrators powerless to deal with dangerous 
students," " but instead allowed "the use of normal, 
nonplaceiuent-changing procedures, including temporary sus­
pension of up to 10 school days for students posing an imme­
diate threat to others' safety."^ 
The Supreme Court did modify the appellate court's 
ruling that an initial suspension of 20 days did not fall 
under §1415(e)(3) stating: 
402O U.S.C.A. §1415 ( e ) ( 3 ) (1990). 
41484 U.S.305, 306. 
42Ibid., 323. 
43Ibid. , 306. 
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Because we believe the agency [The United States De­
partment of Education, Office of Civil Rights] cor­
rectly determined that a suspension in excess of 10 
days does constitute a prohibited "change of place­
ment," we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred to 
the extent it approved suspensions of 20 and 30 days' 
duration. 
The final issue the Supreme Court addressed was the 
order by the district court, affirmed by the appellate 
court, that the State must provide services directly to a 
disabled child, if it is determined in individual cases that 
a local education agency was unable or unwilling to provide 
direct services to the disabled child.The Supreme Court 
was equally divided so the judgment was affirmed. 
A recent landmark case, Florence County School District 
Four v. Shannon Carter, is very similar to Burlington, 
but deals with the IDEA. The parents of a learning disabled 
student brought suit for reimbursement of tuition to a 
private school because the public school system failed to 
provide a free appropriate public education for their daugh­
ter , 
Shannon attended public school in the first grade. She 
attended a private school through the sixth grade. She re-
enrolled in public school for the seventh grade. Because of 
4*Ibid., 326, n. 8. 
45Ibid., 315-16. 
46510 U.S. , 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 ( 1993 ). 
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her poor academic performance during that year, the school 
tested her twice for a learning disability. The school 
ruled that Shannon was not learning disabled. Her parents 
requested additional testing after Shannon continued to 
perform miserably during the first semester of the ninth 
grade. Results of these tests showed that Shannon was 
indeed learning disabled. "Although the disability went 
unnoticed by the school district for almost three years, the 
J tj 
district court found that it was comparatively severe." 
The school system developed an IEP for Shannon, but her 
parents disagreed with it and requested a hearing. Hearing 
officers at both local and state levels upheld the school 
system. The parents placed Shannon in a private school and 
she subsequently graduated in the spring of 1988. This suit 
was filed in July 1986, claiming failure to provide a FAPE. 
The district court ruled in favor of the parents, 
citing the fact that the goals of the proposed IEP and the 
proposed educational placement failed to satisfy the re­
quirements of the IDEA. The district court held that the 
private school provided Shannon with an excellent education; 
therefore, the school district was ordered to reimburse the 
parents expenses totaling $35,716.11 plus prejudgment inter­
est. The school district appealed. 
47950 F . 2d. 156, 158. 
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The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling 
of the district court. The United States Supreme Court 
unanimously affirmed the ruling of the appellate court: 
Decision: Parents held not barred under Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act from reimbursement for 
child's private school placement on grotmds that school 
did not meet all statutory requirements. 
Free Appropriate Public Education 
The phrase "free appropriate public education" is one 
of the mainstays of the EHA and is defined as: 
special education and related services which (A) have 
been provided at public expense, under public supervi­
sion and direction, and without charge, (B) meet the 
standards of the State educational agency, (C) include 
an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary 
school education in the State involved, and (D) are 
provided in conformity with the individualized educa­
tion program required under section 1414(a)(5) of this 
title. 
Since Rowley, the courts have had to decide if a school 
system provided a handicapped child with a free appropriate 
public education in compliance with EHA or IDEA. If the 
courts concluded that the education provided was appropriate 
and there were no other pertinent legal issues, the rulings 
48126 L.Ed.2d 284. 
4920 U.S.C.A. 1401 ( a) ( 18 ) ( 1990). 
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were in favor of the school district.^ On the other hand, 
if the court concluded that the school district did not 
provide a free appropriate public education, the decisions 
were in favor of the parents." 
Geis v. Board of Education of Parsippany-Troy Hills 
involves "free appropriate public education" where the state 
statutes exceed the EHA "floor of opportunity." The second 
issue involves residential placement for the student to best 
achieve educational success. S. Geis (S.G.) was a disabled 
child who has been in a residential placement since he has 
been in school. S.G. suffered from neurological dysfunc­
tion, mental retardation, communication disorder, and chron-
50 See McDowell v. Fort Bend Independent School 
District, 737 F.Supp. 386 (S.D. Tex. 1990), Burke County Board 
of Education v. Denton, 895 F.2d 973 (4th Cir. 1990), P.C, v. 
McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033 (2nd Cir. 1990), Chuhran v. Walled 
Lake Consolidated Schools, 839 F.Supp. 465 (E.D.Mich. 1993), 
student met IEP goals of passing mainstream classes and 
received transition services had received a FAPE. 
^See Block v. District of Columbia, 748 F.Supp. 891 
(D.D.C. 1990), Lester H. By Octavia P. v. Gilhool, 916 F. 2d 
865 (3rd Cir. 1990), plaintiff was awarded two and one-half 
years of compensatory education beyond age 21 because he was 
denied a FAPE, Chris D. v. Montgomery County Board of Educa­
tion, 753 F.Supp 922 (M.D.Ala. 1990), school system did not 
satisfy requirements of EHA in IEP development and implementa­
tion, therefore failed to provide FAPE, Valerie J. v. Derry 
Cooperative School District, 771 F.Supp. 483 (D.N.H. 1991), 
plaintiff awarded compensatory education because of failure to 
provide FAPE, Johnson v. Lancaster-Lebanon Intermediate Unit 
13, Lancaster City School District, 757 F.Supp 606 (E.D.Pa. 
1991), failure to provide FAPE resulted in reimbursement for 
private therapy. 
52589 F.Supp. 269 (D.N.J. 1984), 774 F.2d 575 ( 3rd Cir. 
1985). 
90 
ic illness with emotional overtones. When his parents moved 
to Parsippany, New Jersey, S.G.'s educational placement 
became the responsibility of Parsippany-Troy Hills Regional 
School District. The school district continued S.G.'s 
residential placement for four years. 
In 1981, the school district recommended a change of 
placement for S.G. District personnel wanted to place him 
in the public school in Parsippany. A hearing was held and 
the hearing officer ruled that S.G. would enter public 
school for the next school year. The parents appealed. 
[Tjhe district court held that the New Jersey regula­
tions which implemented the Act created a higher stan­
dard for the education of handicapped than the basic 
opportunity required in order to receive federal fund­
ing. Specifically, the court held that under N.J. 
Admin.Code §§ 6:28-2.1 and 2.2 (1978) "a local public 
school district must provide each handicapped pupil a 
special education and services according to how the 
pupil can best achieve educational success." Geis v. 
Board of Education, 589 F.Supp 269,272 (D.N.J. 1984) 
(emphasis added). 
The district court found that S.G.'s placement in the resi­
dential school would be the least restrictive environment 
for him and he would make the best educational progress 
there. 
On the issue of New Jersey's higher standards, the 
district court ruled that since these state standards were 
involved in the implementation the EHA, the court had the 
53744 F. 2d 575, 579 ( 1985 ). 
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authority to enforce the higher standards. The court also 
ruled that the Eleventh Amendment did not apply to this 
case. The educational implications of this case apply to 
states that have higher standards than the EHA. Those state 
standards will take precedence over federal ones in court. 
Hall by Hall v. Vance County Board of Education1was 
heard by the United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
in 1985. There are three fundamental issues involved: 1) 
reimbursement from public funds for a private school, 2) the 
school's failure to provide information of procedural due 
process, and 3) failure of the public school to provide a 
free appropriate public education. 
The case involved a severely dyslexic student, James 
Hall. He had been educated in Vance County, North Carolina 
public schools from 1974 to Spring, 1980, or six academic 
years. He received resource services, but spent 95% of his 
time in the regular classroom. The parents took him out of 
public school. Two private evaluations were done in 1980. 
They showed that even "with James' impressive ability, James 
was functionally illiterate and that his reading comprehen-
55 sion was untestable. The Halls attempted to place James 
in Oakland School in Boyd Tavern, Virginia, the private 
residential school nearest their home, but the placement 
54774 F. 2d 629 (1985 ). 
55774 F. 2d 629, 632 (4th Cir. 1985). 
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took several months. He was tutored at home from October 
1980 through June 1981. 
In April 1981, when the Halls first learned from some­
one at Oakland that they might be able to obtain public 
funding for James' education at a private school, they 
contacted a lawyer who suggested that they obtain Vance 
County Board of Education approval for his placement at 
Oakland.5b 
The County Board finally evaluated James in 1981 and 
found that his reading and spelling scores had increased at 
least one grade level since the last testing. The school 
proposed public school placement with a new IEP. The par­
ents disagreed and after exhaustive due process filed suit 
in district court. The United States District Court found 
in favor of the parents on all three issues. It found that 
Vance County Board of Education would be responsible for 
reimbursement to the parents for the costs of providing 
James' education through the 1983-84 school year because the 
Board of Education failed to provide the parents with infor­
mation of procedural due process. The United States Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals states: "failure to meet the Act's 
procedural requirements are adequate grounds by themselves 
for holding that the school board failed to provide a 
FAPE.Finally, Vance County Board of Education failed 
56Ibid, 
57Ibid., 635. 
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to provide James with a FAPE prior to January, 1982. The 
United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the 
ruling of the district court. This case has been cited 
frequently in cases addressing FAPE.^ 
In Spielberg v. Henrico County Public Schools^, heard 
by the U.S. Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal in 1988, the 
county schools violated both the spirit and the intent of 
the EHA. By deciding to change the placement of a severely 
handicapped child from a residential facility to a public 
school before developing the IEP, procedural regulations 
were violated. The IEP was then written to support this 
change in placement. According to the district court, this 
violation of procedural due process was sufficient to pre­
vent the school system from providing the child with a free 
appropriate public education. The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the district court's decision to continue the 
child's placement in the residential facility. 
Jonathan Spielberg was a severely retarded nineteen-
year-old student. He functioned at the level of an eighteen 
month old child. Henrico County Public Schools, in 1985, 
began a reevaluation of Jonathan's residential placement. 
This process began only nine months after his regular trien­
58 See Board of Education of Cabell County v. Dienelt, 
843 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1988). 
^853 F.2d 256 (4th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S. 
1016, 109 S.Ct. 1131, 103 L.Ed. 192 (1989). (1989). 
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nial evaluation. From the beginning of the evaluation, 
county personnel focused on a change of placement. The 
court held by definition: "An IEP is developed for each 
handicapped child by school officials and the child's par­
ents. Educational placement is based on the IEP, which is 
fiO 
revised annually." The United States Supreme Court de-
fi i nied the writ of certiorari. 
fl ? Beasley v. School Board of Campbell County, is not a 
federal litigation. The case was heard by the Virginia 
Court of Appeals in 1988. This case involves the issue of 
providing a handicapped student with a free appropriate 
education and appropriate placement. There are no proce­
dural violations involved. 
Darren Beasley attended public school through the 
seventh grade. At the end of the second grade, Darren was 
tested and found eligible for special education. He 
participated in numerous special education programs over the 
next five years. In 1983, the spring of his seventh grade 
year, Darren was given a comprehensive re-evaluation by the 
school system. He was found to be a non-reader and primarily 
60 8 5 3 F. 2d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 1988). 
6icert. denied 489 U.S. 1016, 109 S.Ct. 1131, 103 L.Ed. 
192 (1989). 
82367 S. E. 2d. 738 (Va.App 1988), 380 S.E.2d 884 (Va. 
1989). 
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an auditory learner. Recommendation by the public schools 
to continue his placement was made. 
Darren's parents elected to place him in a private 
school starting that summer. When he was tested in the 
spring of 1984, the results indicated Darren had made at 
least two years progress in reading. When a disagreement 
over the appropriate placement for Darren for the 1984-85 
school year ensued, a procedural review was held. The 
hearing officer held that the IEP proposed did not provide 
Darren a free and appropriate public education. The review­
ing officer upheld the decision. The school board brought, 
suit. When the circuit court reversed the decision of the 
hearing officer, the parents appealed. 
The appellate court citing Rowley for the determination 
of a state providing a free appropriate public education, 
noted that the state must provide ". . . personalized 
instruction with sufficient support services to permit the 
child to benefit educationally fz'om that instruction. 458 
U . S .  a t  2 0 3 ,  1 0 2  S . C t .  a t  3 0 4 9  ( e m p h a s i s  a d d e d ) . S i n c e  
Darren did not benefit from his special education placement 
in the public schools after five years, but did benefit from 
the private school setting, his public school placement had 
been inappropriate. The court found that the appropriate 
program wasn't available in Campbell County Schools or the 
63 3 6 7 S . E . 2d 738, 741. 
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State of Virginia. The appellate court reversed the deci­
sion and remanded the case to the circuit court. 
The school board appealed this decision to the Virginia 
Supreme Court. The court held that there was evidence "that 
the child's alleged lack of sufficient progress in reading 
was due to factors not related to a deficiency in the county 
f? i 
educational program." The court reversed the appellate 
court decision and made a final judgement in favor of the 
school board, finding that a free appropriate public educa­
tion had been provided for the child. 
Exclus ion 
The first exceptional children cases filed on the 
grounds of exclusion or discrimination cited § 504 of the 
Cjr 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. These cases may have caused 
some of the changes in EHA made by the 1990 amendments. 
With the advent of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(AIDS) and AIDS Related Complex (ARC), a new type of exclu­
sion solely based on a disability is occurring in educa-
64380 S. E. 2d 884, 889 (Va. 1989). 
65 See New Mexico Association for Retarded Citizens v. 
State of New Mexico, 495 F.Supp 392 (D.N.M. 1980), 678 F.2d 
847 (10th Cir. 1982), Kerr Center Parents Association v. 
Charles, 572 F.Supp. 448 (1983), 581 F.Supp. 166 (1983), 842 
F.2d 1052. 
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fifi 
tion. The case of Martinez v. School Board of Hills-
fi? 
borough County, Florida deals with this type of exclu­
sion. Eliana was a trainable mentally handicapped (TMH) 
child diagnosed with AIDS Related Complex (ARC). Eliana's 
adoptive mother brought suit claiming violation of the 
child's right to a FAPE in the least restrictive environ­
ment. Mrs. Martinez wanted Eliana placed in a self-con­
tained TMH classroom, not a "mainstream" classroom. Eliana 
was not toilet trained and frequently put her thumb and 
forefinger in her mouth, resulting in saliva on the digits. 
She also suffered from thrush, a disease caused by a para­
sitic fungus that produced white patches and ulcers in the 
mouth. These ulcers could bleed, but Eliana didn't have any 
open ulcers. When the IEP committee met, it recommended a 
homebound placement for Eliana. A hearing officer found the 
homebound placement appropriate because of Eliana's inconti­
nence . 
The federal district court held that Eliana be placed 
in the TMH classroom with certain restrictions. These 
restrictions included: construction of a separate room with 
a large picture window within the TMH classroom; this room 
^ See Board of Ed., Plainfield v. Cooperman, 523 A.2d 
655 (N.J. 1987), Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, 
622 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal. 1987). 
67675 F.Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1987), 692 F. Supp. 1293 
(M.D. Fla 1988), 861 F.2d 1502 (11th Cir. 1988), on rem'd 711 
F. Supp 1066 (M.D.Fla. 1989) 
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must have an adequate sound system and a door giving access 
to an outside corridor. The school board must employ a 
full-time aide to stay with Eliana in the room. Eliana must 
stay in the separate room as long as she was incontinent and 
continued to suck her fingers. When Eliana was toilet 
trained and didn't suck her fingers, she may be integrated 
into the TMH classx'oom. If she developed open sores or 
lesions, she would be returned to the separate room. 
The mother appealed this decision. The appellate court 
vacated the lower court's order. It remanded the case to 
district court for further consideration of the possible 
effects on Eliana both psychologically and educationally 
from this isolation in a separate room. Also the court was 
to examine the balance of least restrictive environment 
against the possible risk of transmission of AIDS. 
On remand, the district court found: 1) the possibili­
ty of transmission with respect to tears, saliva, and urine 
was remote and theoretical, 2) the risk level wasn't "sig­
nificant" to require exclusion of Eliana from the TMH class­
room, and 3) the school nurse would be consulted to evaluate 
the advisability of Eliana being in the classroom on a 
particular day; she would also evaluate another child if 
fiP there was a danger of exposing Eliana to an infection. 
6871 1 F.Supp 1066, 1072. 
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Another case involving a child who tested HIV positive 
is Parents of Child, Code No. 870901W v. CokerThe 
child was a hemophiliac with an emotional disorder and re­
sided in Wagoner County, Oklahoma. The child was placed by 
IEP meeting in the class for emotionally children in the 
public schools, but a temporary restraining order prevented 
the child from attending class. Parents of other children 
in the special education program brought the suit which 
resulted in the restraining order. The grounds for this 
suit were the state statutes regarding contagious diseases. 
The parents of the child, code number 870901W, brought suit 
against the school system, parents group, and the state 
district court judge. The U.S. District Court held that EHA 
statutes take precedence over the state statutes because the 
state accepted federal funding under EHA. Therefore, the 
child was entitled to placement and could not be barred from 
school based on the state statutes. 
In the case of Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School Dis-
70 trict, The major issues are: 1) Is the child considered 
"handicapped" for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act? 
2) Is the child "otherwise qualified" to attend regular 
kindergarten classes for the purpose of the Rehabilitation 
69 6 7 6 F.Supp. 1072 (E.D.Okl. 1987). 
70 6 6 2 F.Supp. 376 (C.D.Cal 1987 ). 
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Act? and 3) Does the child pose a significant risk of harm 
71 to the other students or teachers? 
Ryan Thomas was a kindergarten student infected with 
the AIDS virus. He had no other disabilities. He was a 
premature baby who became infected from contaminated blood 
transfusions received shortly after his birth. He was 
72 diagnosed as being infected early in 1985. Because of 
Ryan's illness, a placement committee met to make recommen­
dation concerning his placement in public school. Placement 
in a regular kindergarten was recommended. He attended 
school for three days in September, 1986. Ryan was involved 
in an incident with another child and bit the child's pant 
leg. The school advised the plaintiffs to keep Ryan at home 
until the placement committee could review its pervious 
placement in light of his current behavior. An evaluator 
"did not predict that Ryan would 'bite again.'"" The 
74 school still recommended "home tutoring" for the remain­
der of the year. The parents filed for a preliminary in­
junction in November citing discrimination under § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
7iIbid. 
72Ibid., 379. 
73Ibid., 381. 
74Ibid. 
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The United States District Court for the Central Dis­
trict of California issued a preliminary injunction in 
December. The court held in the judgment granting permanent 
injunction that: 
Ryan is a 'handicapped person' within the meaning of 
§ 504 ... is 'otherwise qualified' to attend a regu­
lar kindergarten class . . . and [t]here is no evidence 
that Ryan Thomas poses a significant risk of harm to 
his kindergarten classmates or teachers. 
The plaintiff's were also awarded costs and attorneys' fees 
in excess of $40,000. This case came to court before the 
1990 amendments to EHA, so Ryan was not classified as an 
exceptional child, only as a handicapped person. 
?fi In Begay v. Hodel, a handicapped student brought a 
discrimination suit against federal school officials citing 
violation of EHA, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the 
fifth amendment. Lorraine Begay, a 23-year-old handicapped 
Navajo woman, suffered from arthritis so severe that she had 
been confined to a wheelchair since age 13. After finishing 
junior high, she applied for admission to her neighborhood 
high school, Many Farms High School (MFHS). MFHS is a 
boarding school administered by the Bureau of Indian Af­
fairs. She was denied admission to MFHS for four consecu­
75Ibid., 381-2. 
75730 F.Supp. 1001 (D.Ariz. 1990). 
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tive school years (1981-1985) because the school's facili­
ties lacked adequate handicapped bathrooms or ramps," 
Ms. Begay was forced to attend another high school. 
Since she lived approximately 10 miles from the nearest 
paved highway, her daily commute to school over numerous 
poorly surfaced roads was physically painful because of her 
condition. During bad weather the van could not get to Ms. 
Begay's house. She tolerated this situation for two years, 
but her school academic work suffered. Excessive absences 
contributed to her academic problems and finally she quit 
school in October 1983 .78 
Ms. Begay continued her struggle to gain admission to 
MFHS. When her numerous attempts failed, she brought legal 
action in July 1985. "Pursuant to the Court Order of August 
13, 1985, Ms. Begay was finally admitted to MFHS as a full-
79 time residential student." She still managed to graduate 
in May, 1987, which was two years late. 
The United States District Court denied the defen­
dant's motion to dismiss. The court held that "there is 
sufficient basis to support a constitutional damages claim 
on 
within the context of an EHA claim1 and the plaintiff had 
77Ibid., 1003. 
78Ibid. 
7l)Ibid. 
80Ibid., 1010. 
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been denied meaningful access to EHA due process procedures. 
The court further ruled that the plaintiff must "prove at 
trial that defendants' conduct amounted to a constitutional 
0 1 
violation within the context of an EHA claim." 
In a similar § 504 case, Sullivan v. Vallejo City 
8' Unified School, " a disabled student sought injunctive and 
declaratory relief because the school district refused to 
allow her service dog to come to school. The plaintiff, 
Christine Sullivan, was not questioning her IEP or the 
educational necessity of her service dog. Therefore she did 
not bring legal action citing violation of the EHA. In­
stead, she brought suit citing violation of § 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act because she was refused access to the 
school if she was accompanied by her service dog. The 
school district contended that the complaint should be 
dropped because the plaintiff did not exhaust the adminis­
trative remedies stated in the EHA. 
Christine, a 16-year-old handicapped student, attended 
Hogan Senior High School in Vallejo, California. Her dis­
abilities included cerebral palsy, a learning disability, 
and rightside deafness. She used a wheelchair for mobility. 
To increase her independence, she acquired a service dog 
specially trained for handicapped people. 
81Ibid. 
82731 F.Supp. 947 (E.D.Cal 1990). 
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The school district in arguments before the court main­
tained that it had "excluded only the plaintiff's service 
dog from the school premises and not plaintiff herself."^ 
In responding, the court asserted that the 
[d]efendants' attempt to distinguish between plaintiff 
and her service dog for the purposes of admission to 
the school premises cannot be reconciled with either 
the letter or the spirit of the Rehabilitation 
Act. . . .Because a central purpose of the Act is to 
prevent discrimination based on public perception of a 
person's handicap, deference must be shown to the 
manner in which a handicapped person chooses to over­
come the limitations created by her disabling condi­
tion. . . .[T]he statute requires accommodation to the 
plaintiff's handicap; it does not require that she 
accommodate to the views of the public about her condi­
tion. 
The court restrained the school district from interfering 
with the plaintiff's right to be accompanied by her service 
dog. A new IEP meeting was to be held within seven days to 
modify the IEP which ensured "that plaintiff's right to be 
accompanied by her service dog in all aspects of her educa-
QC 
tional program is not impaired," and the new IEP had to 
be in place within 20 days. 
The principle issue in Gaudiello v. Delaware County 
flfi Intermediate Unit is a challenge by the parents of the 
83Ibid., 958. 
85Ibid., 962. 
86796 F.Supp. 849 (E.D.Pa. 1992). 
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mainstream placement of their handicapped child. The plain­
tiffs filed their action citing § 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act instead of pursuing the administrative procedures and 
remedies provided by the IDEA. The school district was 
granted summary judgment because the District Court held 
that the IDEA was the exclusive avenue through which the a 
child with disabilities has equal protection to a FAPE. The 
court asserted that § 504 can't be used to bypass the proce­
dural due process in IDEA. The plaintiffs placed great 
confidence in Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School Dis-
go 
tric-t but the Court determined that the Sullivan ruling 
was not applicable to the facts in this case. 
Due Process 
Procedural due process is definitely spelled out in 
89 EHA. Parents' and students' rights are specifically de­
fined as are administrative procedures. Parents must ex­
haust all administrative remedies before legal action can be 
taken. As stated previously, failures of the school board 
to meet due process requirements are adequate grounds by 
themselves for finding that a free appropriate public educa­
87Ibid., 853. 
88731 F.Supp. 947 (E.D. Cal. 1990). 
8920 U.S.C.A. §1400 et seq. 
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90 tion has not been provided. On the other hand, legal 
actions brought by parents have been dismissed or found in 
favor of the school district because the parents have failed 
91 to exhaust administrative remedies. Courts also have 
ruled that legal actions must be brought within the time 
92 allowed by EHA. The last major due process issue is, 
have any of the student's or parents' right been violated? 
The one significant legal aspect of David D. v. 
93 Dartmouth School Committee is the ruling by the court 
regarding state statutes that exceed federal guidelines. 
When state statutes exceed the federal Act in the definition 
90Hall by Hall v. Vance County, 744 F.2d 629, 635. See 
Knight v. District of Columbia, 691 F.Supp. 1567 (D.D.C 1988), 
failure to comply with "stay-put" provision of EHA, Board of 
Education of Cabell County v. Dienelt, 843 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 
1988), school failed to conduct multi-disciplinary review, 
failed to involve parents in IEP development, failed to 
provide FAPE. 
Q1 
'See Timms v. Metropolitan School District of Wabash 
County, Indiana, 722 F.2d 1310 (1983), Abney by Kantor v. 
District of Columbia, 849 F.2d 1491 (D.C.Cir. 1988), Digre v. 
Roseville Schools Independent District No. 623, 841 F.2d 245 
(8th Cir. 1988), Laura V. v. Providence School Board, 680 
F.Supp. 66 (D.R.I. 1988), Evans v. District No. 17 of Douglas 
County, Neb., 841 F.2d 824 (8th Cir. 1988), Secor v. Richmond 
School Joint District No. 2 Lisbon-Pewaukee, 689 F.Supp 869 
(E.D. Wis. 1988), Crocker v. Tennessee Secondary School 
Athletic Ass'n, 873 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1989), Pink by Crider 
v. Mt. Diablo Unified School District, 738 F.Supp. 345 (N.D. 
Cal. 1990). 
92 See I.D. v. Westmoreland School District, 788 F.Supp. 
632 (D.N.H. 1991), 788 F.Supp. 634 (D.N.H. 1992). 
93775 F. 2d 411 (1st Cir. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 
1140, 106 S.Ct. 1790, 90 L.Ed. 2d 336 (1986). 
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of free appropriate public education and substantive stan­
dards, the court will incorporate these statutes into its 
decision. The other legal issues in this case are the 
appropriateness of the IEP and residential placement versus 
public school placement. 
David was born with Down's Syndrome. David resided in 
Massachusetts. At the time of this suit, he was 17-years-
old with a functional learning and skills level of a kinder-
gartner. He had made some academic progress during the 
years he was at the Dartmouth School. Yet, David's behavior 
had become increasingly inappropriate in recent years. He 
demonstrated little if any self-control in unfamiliar or 
unstructured situations. "David has repeatedly and unre­
lentingly engaged in sexual and aggressive behavior directed 
at persons and animals."^ The major concern of his par­
ents was that this behavior would prevent David from becom­
ing "a productive adult with a job in a sheltered workshop 
and [result in] denial of his access to and living within 
95 the mainstream community." The plaintiffs felt that "the 
Dartmouth School has not taught and will not be able to 
teach David self-control, rendering the IEP the Town 
[Dartmouth School Committee] proposed for him fatally defi­
94Ibid., 415. 
95Ibid. 
108 
98 cient." The district court agreed with the parents and 
the appellate court affirmed this ruling. 
The appropriate educational placement for David, ac­
cording to the four independent evaluators, was "a compre­
hensive, 24-hour, highly structured special education pro­
gram that would address his social and behavioral needs. 
The considered opinion of the experts was that learning the 
self-control needed would take David one to two years. He 
could then be returned to the mainstream community. Again, 
the district court concurred with the plaintiffs and the 
First Circuit United States Court of Appeals affirmed the 
ruling. 
When a state accepts funds under EHA regulations, it 
agrees to educate disabled children according to the "educa-
AQ 
tion standards of the State educational agency."30 The 
appellate court held that the state statutes must be incor­
porated into any decision made by a federal court otherwise 
there would be "double legal standards dependent solely upon 
the aggrieved party's choice [federal or state] of fo-
aq 
rum." In applying the higher state standards, the court 
held the IEP was inappropriate "to assure the maximum possi­
98Ibid. 
97Ibid., 416. 
9820 U.S.C.A. § 1412(6) (1990). 
99775 F. 2d 411, 419. 
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ble development in the least restrictive environment of a 
child with special needs. 
The case of Roland M, v. Concord School Commit tee^^ 
is a parallel to David D. The original suit was brought by-
parents of a handicapped child challenging the adequacy and 
appropriateness of the IEP. The underlying legal issue is 
the state statute which exceeds federal standards under EHA. 
Matthew M. was a 15-year-old handicapped child who 
resided in Concord, Massachusetts. His disabilities includ­
ed difficulties with visual perception, visual tracking and 
visual motor skills as well as fine and gross motor coordi­
nation. He was easily distracted. "The parents assail the 
district court's unwillingness to find Matthew also 'suf­
fered from Attention Deficit Disorder.'He had diffi­
culty relating to peers. Still, David had average intelli­
gence and "enjoys significant potential for academic 
. t?l 03 progress. 
Matthew attended Concord public schools through the 
fifth grade. He was in a self-contained classroom for LD 
students. Then his parents rejected the IEP for the 1986-87 
*^Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 71B, § 2 (Law. Co-op. 1994). 
IOI910 F. 2d 983 (IstCir. 1990), cert, denied, 499 U.S. 
912 (1991). 
102Ibid. , 988 no. 2. 
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school year and his continued placement in public school. 
Instead, they enrolled Matthew in a private, residential 
school. Concord did not agree. The parents brought suit in 
district court after the hearing officer only found partial­
ly for the parents. 
The district court found that the IEP developed by the 
Concord School Committee was adequate and appropriate to 
assure Matthew's maximum possible development and in fact 
provided related services the private school could not 
provide. Therefore, the public school placement was the 
appropriate placement for Matthew, The appellate court 
affirmed the district court ruling. 
The case of Tice v. Botetourt County School Board'^ 
deals with procedural due process violations in the develop­
ment of an appropriate IEP, educational placement and reim­
bursement of educational expenses prior to appropriate IEP 
and educational placement. 
Matthew Tice was an eleven-year-old boy with above 
average intelligence suffering from learning and emotional 
disabilities. He was a resident of Virginia and attended a 
Botetourt County public school. Matthew's problems became 
apparent when he had difficulty performing at school. 
After a conference with his teacher, the parents for­
mally requested a special education evaluation. It took the 
1049O8 F. 2d 1200 (4th Cir. 1990). 
Ill 
school 22 working days to act on the parental request. This 
is the first procedural violation, since this meeting should 
have occurred within 10 working days after the referral. 
This minor procedural violation was compounded by the exces­
sive delay of school officials in convening the placement 
committee. It took the school officials over 200 days to 
convene the placement committee. This entire evaluation 
should have been completed within 65 working days. 
The committee found Matthew ineligible for special 
education services, but recommended he receive counseling at 
the expense of his parents. The parents requested postpone­
ment of the committee decision until they could have Matthew 
evaluated by a private professional. The school officials 
agreed and even acquiesced to pay for the evaluation. 
The psychiatrist examined Matthew and recommended 
immediate placement in the special education program because 
of deteriorating mental and emotional problems. Three days 
after the school system received a copy of the doctor's 
report, Matthew became hysterical at school and was sent 
home. His condition became progressively worse and he was 
admitted to a psychiatric center later that day. Matthew 
had suffered a nervous breakdown. Throughout his hospital­
ization, Matthew received daily educational services provid­
ed by the hospital. Matthew was hospitalized for 20 days. 
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During this time the school committee reconvened and 
found Matthew eligible for special education services, but 
postponed IEP development until later. Later, the IEP was 
developed by school professional and Mrs. Tice. The IEP did 
not provide for individual psychological counseling. Mrs. 
Tice agreed with and signed the IEP. 
Several months later, the Tices demanded full reim­
bursement from the School Board for Matthew's hospitaliza­
tion and counseling. The School Board refused and a due 
process hearing was held. The hearing officer ruled in 
favor of the school system. The state review officer af­
firmed the decision. The parents filed suit in district 
court. After trial, the district court upheld the ruling of 
the review officers. The. parents again appealed. 
The United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that 1) the school district did not comply with EHA require­
ments because it delayed providing an IEP, 2) the IEP that 
was eventually developed was adequate and appropriate, and 
3) the parents were entitled to reimbursement for education 
expenses incurred prior to adoption of IEP. 
In Hiller v. Board of Education of Brunswick Central 
105 School District, the parents of an educationally handi­
capped child originally brought suit seeking reimbursement 
105 6 8 7 F.Supp. 735 (N.D.N.Y. 1988), 743 F.Supp 958 
(N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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for certain educational related expenses. The second suit 
filed in district court alleged their child was a handi­
capped child and had been denied a FAPE because of procedur­
al due process violations. 
David Hiller entered the Brunswick School District in 
the fall of 1985 as a fifth grade student. There was no 
documentation of a learning disability or handicapping 
condition from his previous school in Albany, New York. 
When David began to experience some difficulties in the 
classroom, the teacher discussed the problems with the 
mother, who requested an evaluation of her son for a learn­
ing disability (LD). 
David was evaluated by the school psychologist. He was 
not diagnosed as a learning disabled child, but he did have 
some learning problems that could be improved with modifica­
tions to his educational program. A remedial program was 
undertaken. 
The parents had two private evaluations done on David. 
Only one of these evaluations labeled David as LD. Even 
though the school officials violated due process procedures, 
they tried to accommodate placement of David in a resource 
program. They continued his placement in the resource 
program until the parents removed him from public school. 
The United States District Court for the Northern 
District of New York ruled that 1) David demonstrated a weak 
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attention span and had difficulties in handwriting, but was 
not handicapped within the interpretation of EAHCA, 2) the 
educational program implemented by the school was designed 
to facilitate educational benefits for David as required by 
EAHCA, and 3) the procedural violation committed by the 
school officials did not violate the spirit of the EAHCA 
therefore David had not been denied a free appropriate 
public education.^ 
IEP, Mainstreaming and Placement 
The appropriateness of an IEP, mainstreaming of a 
student and appropriate educational placement are three 
closely related areas. The IDEA provides for development of 
107 the IEP before placement decisions are made. The courts 
have ruled in favor of parents when the conclusion of fact 
is that a school district failed to provide an appropriate 
1 0 0  
IEP, failed to mainstream or inappropriately main-
108743 F.Supp 958 (N.D.N.Y. 1990). 
1072O U.S.C.A. § 1401 (20) (1990 ). 
108 See Russell by Russell v. Jefferson School District, 
609 F.Supp. 605 (D.C.Cal. 1985), inadequate IEP and inappro­
priate placement, Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate 
Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S 
1030, 109 S.Ct. 838, 102 L.Ed.2D 970 (1989), violated proce­
dural requirements in developing IEP. 
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109 streamed a disabled child or failed to place a disabled 
child in an appropriate program.11" On the other hand, 
courts have ruled in favor of school districts when the IEP 
developed is found to be appropriate for the disabled 
child,111 or appropriate mainstreaming has been implement­
ed in accordance with least restrictive environment provi­
sion, or educational placement was correct and appropri-
109 See Liscio v. Woodland Hills School District, 734 
F.Supp 689 (W.D.Pa 1989), failure of the school system to 
mainstream handicapped student for nonacademic subjects, 
Oberti v. Board of Education of Borough of Clementon School 
District, 995 F.2d 1204 (3rd 1993), failure of school system 
to mainstream student, Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F.Supp. 968 
(N.D.N.Y. 1993), failure of school system to mainstream 
handicapped student appropriately. 
llf)See Block v. District of Columbia, 748 F.Supp. 891 
(D.D.C. 1990), failure of school system to provide a timely 
IEP, Brown v. Wilson County School Board, 747 F.Supp 436 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1990), residential rehabilitation facility only appro­
priate placement for brain damaged student, Clovis Unified 
School District v. California Office of Administrative 
Hearings, 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990), school district 
responsible for maintaining placement in hospital until due 
process decided. 
^See Gillette v. Fairland Board of Education, 932 
F.2d 551 (6th Cir 1991), IEP and therefore placement were 
appropriate. 
^"See Eva N. v. Brock, 741 F.Supp. 626, educational 
placement was correct, Roland M. v. Concord School Committee, 
910 F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1990 ) cert, denied, 499 U.S. 912 
(1991), court held that parents' placement of child in a 
private school did not meet state standards to assure maximum 
development, A.E. by and through Evans v. Independent School 
District No. 25, 936 F.2d 472, student wasn't handicapped and 
therefore didn't qualify under IDEA. 
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1 I 1 Harrell v. Wilson County Schools, is a North Caro­
lina case not a federal case. Three major issues were 
argued: 1) were due process procedures violated; 2) did the 
IEP meet students unique needs and 3) was the placement 
appropriate for this hearing-impaired child. One additional 
legal issue involves North Carolina's higher standards for 
substantive outcomes than the EHA. 
Marguerite Harz^ell was a hearing-impaired child living 
in Wilson County, North Carolina. She never attended Wilson 
County Public Schools, but had been enrolled in Central 
Institute for the Deaf (CID) in St Louis, Missouri since 
1973.^ In 1978, her parents applied for a grant to cover 
the costs of sending her to CID. The grant was denied, but 
they sent Marguerite back to CID anyway. 
The school system then evaluated Marguerite's needs to 
ascertain if the school system could meet them. Subsequent­
ly, a committee developed an IEP and proposed placement in a 
regular sixth grade class with support services. The par­
ents did not agree with the recommendations and appealed. 
The hearing officers at the local and state level affirmed 
the committee's decision. The parents again appealed, this 
11358 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E.2d 687 ( 1982), appeal 
dismissed, 306 N.C. 740, 295 S.E. 2d 759 ( 1982), cert, denied, 
460 U.S.1012 ( 1983) . 
***58 N.C. App. 260. 
117 
time to the Superior Court of Wilson County. This court 
also affirmed the decision. 
The state appellate court also affirmed the hearing 
officers' decisions that the IEP developed was appropriate 
and placement in a regular sixth grade with support services 
met both federal and state requirements under the EHA. In 
regard to North Carolina's higher standards, the court stat­
ed : 
Our statute, as progressive as it may be, was not 
designed to require the development of a Utopian 
educational program for handicapped students any more 
than the public schools are required to provide Utopian 
educational programs for non-handicapped students.' 
Lastly, the state appellate court held that there were no 
violations of due process procedures. 
11 fi In Roncker v. Walter, the parent of a handicapped 
child challenged the educational placement of her son. 
Neill Roncker was a severely retarded child. His trainable 
mentally retarded (TMR) classification denoted an IQ below 
50. He suffered from seizures, but was on medication. He 
requires constant supervision because he was unable to 
II? recognize dangerous situations. 
1I558 N.C. App. 260, 293 S.E. 2d 687, 691. 
'^700 F.2d 1058 6th Cir. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 
864, 104 S.Ct. 196, 78 L.Ed.2d 171 (1983). 
117Ibid., 1060. 
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The school system recommended placement in a county 
school program instead of a city program. The county school 
recommendation was specifically for TMR students, but Neill 
would receive no interaction with nonhandicapped students. 
The parents refused this placement and requested a due 
process hearing. The hearing officer ruled in favor of the 
parents. The school appealed to the Ohio State Board of 
Education. The State Board ruled that Neill should be 
placed in a county program but, because he needed contact 
with nonhandicapped students, they suggested a split pro­
gram. The parent brought suit in district court. The court 
ruled in favor of the school district and the parents ap­
pealed . 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded 
the decision of the district court. The court stated that, 
this case involved a mainstreaming issue and the failure of 
the district court to give "due weight" to the administra­
tive proceedings. Also, the court asked if "the district 
court erred in refusing to allow this case to proceed as a 
118 class action?" The appellate court held that de novo 
review was required giving "due weight" to the administra­
tive proceedings. The court held that because the EHA 
requires individual placement decisions, does not bar all 
class actions under the law. 
I18Ibid., 1062-63. 
119 
In deciding between a mainstream placement or a "more 
restrictive environment" the court held that: 
some handicapped children simply must be educated in 
segregated facilities either because the handicapped 
child would not benefit from mainstreaming, because any 
marginal benefits received from mainstreaming are far 
outweighed by the benefits gained from services which 
could not feasibly be provided in the non-segregated 
setting, or because the handicapped child is a disrup­
tive force in the non-segregated setting. 
One additional court assertion was made in this deci­
sion regarding the cost of a placement. "Cost is a proper 
factor to consider since excessive spending on one handi-
1 ?0 capped child deprives other handicapped children." The 
court further explained this position. "Cost is no defense, 
however, if the school district has failed to use its funds 
to provide proper continuum of alternative placements for 
•jot 
handicapped children." 
122 Scituate School Committee v. Robez't B. is very sim­
ilar to Hall, but the major issue deals with the IEP for the 
disabled student. There are three germane legal issues: 1) 
Did the Scituate School Committee follow incorrect due 
process procedures in notification to parents of the IEP 
1I9Ibid., 1063. 
120Ibid. 
121Ibid. 
I22620 F.Supp 1224 (D.C.R.I. 1985), affirmed 795 F.2d 
77 (1986) 
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committee meeting. If so, did these errors invaxidate the 
IEP? 2) Was the IEP adequate? and 3) Are the parents enti­
tled to reimbursement of tuition to the private school? 
Todd B. attended Scituate Rhode Island Public Schools 
for a total of three and one-half years. He was diagnosed 
as learning disabled. An IEP was developed by a committee, 
including Mrs. B., placing Todd in the public school. Mrs. 
B. requested a hearing. The hearing officer found in favor 
of the school system. The parents appealed. The state re­
versed the decision of the hearing officer. The school 
committee appealed. The district court found: 1) the 
committee's failure to give the parents proper notification 
of the IEP committee meeting was not significant enough to 
invalidate the IEP, 2) the IEP was adequate to meet Todd's 
needs and provide a FAPE, and 3) because the IEP was appro­
priate, the parents were denied any reimbui-sement for pri­
vate school expenses. This decision was affirmed by the 
123 federal appellate court 
The case of A. W. By & Through N.W. v. Northwest R-l 
12 i School District is very similar to Roncker. The parents 
of a handicapped child requested placement of their child in 
123795 F. 2d 77 ( 1986). 
I24813 F. 2d 158 (8th Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 484 
U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 144, 98 L.Ed.2d 100 (1988) 
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a regular school instead of in a state school exclusively 
for handicapped children. 
A.W. has Down's syndrome. He resided in Missouri. 
When his mother attempted to enroll him in the neighborhood 
school, he was referred for testing and services. The 
testing showed that A.W. was severely mentally retarded and 
was classified as "severely handicapped" under state guide­
lines. This classification meant A.W. was eligible for 
placement in a state school exclusively for handicapped 
children. His parents disputed this classification and 
challenged his placement as a violation of the "least re­
strictive environment" provision of the EHA. In order for 
A.W. to be mainstreamed in the regular school, a specially 
trained teacher would have to be hired. There wasn't a 
teacher already employed by that school to teach severely 
handicapped children. After following due process proce­
dures, the parents brought suit in district court. 
The district court ruled that 1) A.W. was severely 
handicapped, 2) the state school placement provided A.W. 
with an appropriate public education, 3) the mainstreaming 
provision did not require A.W. placement in the regular 
school. The court held that because of the minimal benefits 
A.W. would receive from mainstreaming, the placement was not 
feasible. The court also took into consideration to cost of 
adding one teacher who would, in all probability, be teach­
122 
ing only A.W. The court stated that since the funds avail­
able are finite, it could not justify taking benefits away 
from handicapped children for this purpose. The Eighth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the dis­
trict court. 
In the case of Ka.tta.ri by Thomas v. District of Colum-
125 bia the major issues are 1) Can the public school pro­
vide the services required by the child's IEP? and 2) Is the 
public school setting the appropriate placement for the 
child? When the hearing officer held that public school 
placement was appropriate for Sarah, her parents sought a 
judicial review. The district court held public school 
placement was not appropriate for Sarah. The school system 
appealed. 
Sarah Kattan was a five-year-old multiply-handicapped 
child. Her specific deficiencies made full-time special 
education placement with numerous related services neces­
sary. Her parents enrolled her in a private pre-school 
progi^am for the 1987-88 school year. In October, The Dis­
trict of Columbia Public Schools [DCPS] developed an IEP for 
Sarah. 
Sarah's IEP requires (1) an individual OT [occupational 
therapy] program of four half-hour sessions, two times 
a week, (2) fine and gross motor skill instruction, (3) 
speech and language therapy in half-hour sessions three 
l25691 F.Supp 1539 (D.D.C. 1988). 
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times a week, (4) a program facilitating socialization, 
and (5) adaptive physical education once a week. AR 
Exh. G at 3a-3s. Sarah's IEP also encourages OT col­
laboration with requirements (2), (3), and (5). 
The court found that Sarah needed an integrated occupational 
therapy (OT) program to receive any benefit from her special 
education program. The court determined that the 
DCPS's failure to provide OT services to Sarah, as well 
as other handicapped children in the District of Colum­
bia who have required such services, is systemic and 
the result of apparently irreconcilable bureaucratic 
disarray, continuing contractual disputes, inability to 
attract occupational therapists, and total failure of 
funding.1<!' 
The court also noted that 28 other handicapped DCPS students 
attended a private school, Ivymount, in Rockville, Maryland, 
at the District's expense. Because of these problems, the 
court ordered that 1) the appropriate placement for Sarah 
was in the private school setting at Ivymount and 2) the 
public school would place and fund Sarah at the Ivymount. 
The court denied the parents' request that Sarah's placement 
not be changed without express consent of her parents for a 
period of two years. 
There are two important implications for educators. 
First, if an IEP states that a related service is warranted 
for a disabled child to benefit from educational placement, 
I26691 F.Supp. 1539, 1541. 
I27691 F.Supp 1539, 1545. 
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it must be provided. Second, if a school says that it can 
provide a particular service but doesn't, that school may be 
paying for a private placement. 
The case of Lachman v. Illinois State Board of Educa-
128 tion is the opposite of Kattan. The parents wanted the 
school officials to place their deaf child in a neighborhood 
school. The parents also wanted a specific program, cued 
speech, taught. The school system advocated the total 
communication approach which relies heavily on sign language 
to communicate. 
Benjamin Lachman was a profoundly deaf seven-year-old 
child. The school district in which he resides provides 
services for hearing impaired students through a Regional 
Hearing Impaired Program (RHIP). These RHIP programs were 
located in schools outside Benjamin's neighborhood. School 
officials maintained that the appropriate placement for 
Benjamin was in a self-contained classroom, where he would 
spend at least 50% of his school day. The other 50% would 
be spent in mainstream activities. 
The appellate court determined that the real issue 
between the parents and the school district was the appro­
priate method or technique used to educate Benjamin. The 
district court had decided that the district officials had 
complied with EAHCA. The appellate court agreed: 
128852 F. 2d 290 ( 7th Cir. 1988). 
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[P]arents, no matter how well-motivated, do not have a 
right under the EAHCA to compel a school district to 
provide a specific program or employ a specific method­
ology in providing for education of their handicapped 
child.luJ 
This ruling is encouraging for school administrators. In 
essence, it means that school personnel can develop IEP's 
using proven methodologies and the covirts will reasonably 
uphold them. 
In Cronin v. Board of Education of East Rampo Central 
no School District the parents of a disabled child sought a 
preliminary injunction to continue the current educational 
placement of their child until administrative due process 
procedures were completed. The three issues that the court 
ruled on were: 1) Is graduation of a handicapped student a 
"change in placement" under EHA? 2) Does graduation during 
the procedural due process violate the "stay-put" provision 
of the EHA? and 3) Is the student entitled to a preliminary 
injunction to require the school district to reinstate him 
in the education program? 
Bruce Cronin, a 20-years-old emotionally disabled 
student, lived in Monsey, New York. In 1986, he was en­
rolled in both a "mainstream" vocational training program at 
BOCES (Board of Cooperative Educational Services), a region-
I29852 F. 2d 290, 297. 
130689 F.Supp 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
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al center, and special classes at Karafin School. Bruce 
received passing grades in the vocational program for two 
years. The Committee on the Handicapped (COH) informed the 
parents that Bruce would be graduated from high school at 
the end of the 1986-87 school year. After receiving a 
letter from BOCES stating that Bruce should continue in that 
program another year, the parents requested an impartial 
hearing to resolve the conflict. 
The hearing was held before graduation. The parents 
contended that Bruce had not met the objectives established 
for him at BOCES and should not be graduated. Before the 
Impartial Hearing Officer's (IHO) decision, Bruce "was 
1 0 j 
graduated and received a regular diploma.1 The IHO 
eventually upheld the school district, but also stated that 
Bruce might be able to attend the BOCES program through 
Vocational Rehabilitation. An appeal was made to the Com­
missioner of Education who upheld the IHO. The parents 
"filed the instant action pursuant to The Education of All 
I V) 
Handicapped Children Act" " for a preliminary injunction. 
The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York heard this case April 1988. Using the 
logic in Honig v. Doe, the court held: 
131Ibid., 199. 
132Ibid., 200. 
133484 U.S. 304, 108 S. Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 ( 1988). 
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Courts have found that an expulsion of a handicapped 
student constitutes a 'change in placement' within the 
meaning of the EHA. , . .Because graduation is similar 
to long-term suspension and expulsion in that it re­
sults in total exclusion of a child from his or her 
educational placement, graduation would appear to be a 
'change in educational placement' implicating the 
mandatory procedural safeguard of the EHA. 
Because the court finds that graduation is a change in 
educational placement, then the school district did violate 
the "stay-put" provision of the EHA and must "immediately 
reinstate Bruce to the BOCES program during the pendency of 
1 ̂  
these proceedings." The court also held that "the stay-
put provision [would be rendered] meaningless because the 
school district could unilaterally graduate handicapped 
children. 
Visco.by Visco v. School District of Pittsburgh,^ 
involves issues of appropriate IEP, placement in a private 
school setting and application of EHA principles. Jennifer 
and Rene Visco were hearing-impaired children. Their moth­
er, Rita, was also hearing-impaired. Jennifer and Rene 
attended a private school only for hearing-impaired chil­
dren. The school district evaluated the children in 1981 
and recommended placement in public school programs for 
134 6 8 9 F.Supp 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1988 ), 202-3. 
135Ibid. 
135Ibid. , 202 n. 4. 
I37684 F.Supp. 1310 (W.D.Pa. 1988). 
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hearing-impaired students. The parent refused and began due 
process proceedings. When these hearings ruled in favor of 
the school system, the parent brought suit in United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. 
The parent contended that since the children lived in a 
deaf household where lip reading and speech had little 
significance, they needed emphasis on these skills at 
school. The court held that the children would receive more 
benefit in the long run from remaining in the private 
school. They would be mainstreamed anyway into the public 
school in the tenth grade after graduation from the private 
school. The court further held that the School District of 
Pittsburgh would continue to pay for this schooling. The 
court, in one final note, severely admonished the lawyers 
for taking so long to bring the case to a resolution. 
1  9 0  
Thomas v. Cincinnati Board of Education is another 
case involving an IEP and appropriate placement of a multi­
ple disabled child. Emily Thomas, an eleven-year-old, was 
severely retarded, multi-handicapped and confined to a 
wheelchair. She had a gastrostomy tube and breathed through 
a tracheostomy which required continual monitoring and 
suctioning. Emily had been receiving one hour of home 
training per week provided by an agency other than by the 
public schools. Her physician recommended placement in a 
I38918 F. 2d 618 (6th Cir 1990). 
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small, self-contained special education program for severely 
139 and profoundly retarded. The initial IEP required 
placement in the public schools in a small self-contained 
special education class. Before the IEP could be implement­
ed, several committee members, upon further consideration 
and investigation, changed their recommendations. They 
decided one hour per day of home instruction would be more 
appropriate for Emily considering her disabilities. The 
mother asked for a hearing. The hearing officer found for 
the parent. Cincinnati Board of Education (CBE) appealed to 
the State Level Reviewing Officer (SLRO) who found for CBE. 
The district court reversed the SLRO's decision. The appel­
late court reversed the district court decision and remanded 
the case stating "the mainstreaming concept is simply 
inapplicable."^® The court concluded that Emily would 
benefit from the home instruction. 
In the case of Christophez* M. v. Corpus Christi Inde­
pendent School District^, the major issue was the length 
of the school day provided for the child as stated in the 
IEP. Christopher M. was a profoundly mentally and physical­
ly handicapped child. He suffered from extreme physical 
distress to prolonged stimulation and required frequent rest 
133Ibid., 621. 
H0Ibid., 627. 
H1933 F.2d 1285 (5th Cir. 1991). 
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periods. In developing his IEP, it was determined that a 
four-hour school day including two hours of instruction 
interspersed with two hours of rest periods was appropriate. 
It was also determined that this amount of time was all that 
Christopher could tolerate physically or benefit from educa­
tionally. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded "to 
presume that every child's school day should be of uniform 
length is at odds with the conception of individually tai-
14 ? lored education embodied in the EHA. 
For educators the significance of this case is that the 
length of the school day doesn't have to be seven hours for 
every child. The appropriate length of the school day must 
be determined on a case-by-case basis taking into consider­
ation the educational benefit received by the child balanced 
against any harm to the child that could be caused by a full 
141 seven-hour day. 
In the case In re Conklinparents of a learning 
disabled child brought suit challenging the IEP and there­
fore educational placement of their son. Thomas Conklin, a 
li2Ibid., 1291. 
^See Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, cert. denied, 
499 U.S. 938 (1991 ), student was not entitled to extended 
school year program under EHA, Johnson v. Independent School 
District No. 4 of Bixby, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, 921 F.2d 1022 
(10th Cir. 1990), summary judgement was reversed and case was 
remanded to district court to decide if summer educational 
program is warranted. 
H4946 F.2d. 306 (4th Cir. 1991). 
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13-year-old dyslexic, lived in Anne Arundel County, Mary­
land. He was diagnosed as learning disabled early in his 
school career. Consequently, an IEP was developed and he 
was mainstreamed with supplemental services. This program 
didn't work for Thomas, so his IEP was reevaluated. His 
parents had him tested by a private consultant. On the 
recommendations of this person, the parents placed Thomas in 
a private summer school program at their own expense. 
The school district continued his placement the next 
school-year, but increased the number of supplementary 
hours. The parents requested placement in a self-contained 
class. The school did not do this. The parents asked for a 
hearing. They also removed Thomas from public school and 
placed him in a private school program designed especially 
for learning disabled students. 
The local and state hearing officers ruled in favor of 
the school system. The parents brought suit in U.S. Dis­
trict Court while the school system filed suit in the Cir­
cuit Court of Anne Arundel County. The state suit was 
removed to the federal court, where the two suits were 
combined. The district court ruled: 1) the IEP did not 
provide a FAPE for Thomas, but an additional two hours of 
private tutoring per week would bring the IEP into compli­
ance with EHA and 2) the parents would be allowed to recover 
132 
some of their expenses for private tutoring and attorney's 
fees. The parents appealed. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dis­
trict court's ruling regarding additional tutoring and 
attorney's fees, but remanded to the district court to 
decide if Maryland's statutes exceeded the EHA statutes. 
The District Court, in turn, remanded this to the state 
court. 
The question of appropriate placement continues to be 
litigated*^. The courts still hold that "appropriate" does 
not mean "best" or "maximum." In Angevine v. Smith^ the 
parents of a multiple handicapped child brought action chal­
lenging the decision that public school placement of their 
child, Ann Marie, was appropriate rather than a private 
school. The hearing officer found that Ann Marie's place­
ment by District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) in Sharpe 
School was appropriate. The U.S. District Court for D.C. 
overturned the findings of the hearing officer and found in 
favor of the parents. The court ordered reimbursement of 
educational expenses paid to the parents by DCPS. 
145 See Russell by Russell v. Jefferson School District, 
609 F.Supp. 605 (D.C.Cal. 1985), Liscio v. Woodland Hills 
School District, 734 F.Supp 689 (W.D.Pa 1989), Oberti v. Board 
of Education of Borough of Clementon School District, 995 F.2d 
1204 (3rd 1993), Mavis v. Sobol, 839 F.Supp.- 968 (N.D.N.Y. 
1993). 
146959 F. 2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1992). 
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When DCPS appealed this decision, the U.S. District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the deci­
sion. The court indicated that the district court's deci­
sion may have been influenced by the comparison of a public 
school and a private school program, but the question of 
comparison was not before the court. The appellate court 
stated "EHA, however, requires the District to provide Ann 
Marie with an appropriate education, not the best education 
possible. 
Another case in a similar vein is Granite School Dis-
| JO 
trict v. Shannon M. by Myrna M. The parents of Shannon 
M., a six-year-old medically fragile child, wanted the 
school district to provide the constant tracheostomy care 
required for their daughter to be mainstreamed in a regular 
first grade class. Granite School District maintained that 
nursing/tracheostomy care is a "medical service" under IDEA 
and therefore should be excluded. 
Shannon was classified as "orthopedically impaired." 
She was confined to a motorized wheelchair. The IEP devel­
oped for the 1990-91 school year for Shannon required home-
bound instruction instead of mainstreaming. Parents asked 
for a due process hearing. Both the Administrative Hearing 
H7Ibid., 296. 
H8787 F.Supp. 1020 (D. Utah 1992). 
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Officer and the State Review Panel found in favor of the 
parents. 
The school district appealed and asked for summary 
judgment. The facts in this case were not in dispute. The 
federal district court only had to rule on points of law. 
The school district contended that Shannon's IEP and home-
bound instruction provided her with a basic floor of oppor­
tunity as required by the IDEA. 
The U.S. District Court held that the full-time nurs-
ing/tracheostomy care Shannon was requesting was not a 
related service under the Act and the school district did 
not have to provide it. The court granted summary judgment 
for the school district maintaining that the student would 
probably receive a greater educational benefit from class­
room participation. Yet, the school district had complied 
with the IDEA by providing the "basic floor of opportunity" 
the Act requires. Finally, the court concluded that Shannon 
could not be mainstreamed satisfactorily 
Trends from OCR Complaints 
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) is part of the United 
States Department of Education (1994). OCR is responsible 
for ensuring that no individual is discriminated against in 
any educational program or activity that receives federal 
funds. 
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OCR enforces five Federal statutes that prohibit dis­
crimination on the following bases: (1) Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (race, color, national 
origin); (2) Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972 (sex); (3) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973 (disability); (4) the Age Discrimination Act of 
1975 (age); and (5) Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (disability). 
Additionally, OCR assists the Department of Education 
(ED) in implementing civil rights provisions in certain 
education statutes, including Title III of the Elemen­
tary and Secondary Act of 1965, as amended (Magnet 
Schools Assistance Program), the Carl D. Perkins Voca­
tional Education Act, and the Individuals with Disabil­
ities Education Act. 
OCR investigates complaints and conducts compliance 
reviews involving 56 state education agencies and 83 
state rehabilitation agencies, including the District 
of Columbia, the U.S. territories , and possessions, 
approximately 16,000 local education agencies, 3,600 
colleges and universities, 5,600 proprietary schools, 
and other recipients of ED funds such as libraries and 
museums. ' 
If a parent of a disabled student or an employee feels 
that his/her civil rights have been violated by school offi­
cials, a complaint is filed with OCR. The complaints must 
be in writing. The OCR has 15 days to acknowledge receipt 
of the complaint. For OCR to act on an allegation, the com­
plaint must be based on discrimination because of race, 
color, national origin, sex, disability, or age. An OCR 
investigation begins by determining: 1) Is the named school 
HI 
U. S. Department of Education, Office of Civil 
Rights, Fiscal Year 1993--Year-End Management Report--March 
1994 prepared by Planning, Analysis and Systems Service, 
Planning and Analysis Division, Reports and Analysis Branch, 
([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Civil Rights, 1994), i. 
136 
receives federal assistance? 2) Is the complaint timely? and 
3) Are other federal agencies or the courts involved?. 
OCR uses Early Complaint Resolution (ECR) if both 
parties are open to mediation. If this settles the problem, 
the case is considered resolved. If ECR doesn't work, an 
investigation begins. The OCR has 120 days to complete an 
investigation. If OCR finds violations, negotiations for 
voluntary compliance are attempted. These negotiations can 
take up to 60 days. After the investigation is completed, a 
letter of finding (LOF) is issued. It states the findings 
and any remedies necessary. The OCR then has 30 days to 
initiate enforcement, if necessary. The maximum time per­
mitted to process a complaint is 225 days. 
When all attempts at voluntary compliance fail, OCR 
takes legal action to terminate federal funding or turns the 
case over to the Justice Department to determine if court 
actions are warranted. 
The type of complaints received by the Office of Civil 
Rights today may be the court cases of tomorrow. This 
information can be extremely helpful in predicting trends in 
educational case law before they happen. Each LOF reads 
like a mini-law case. Each alleged violation is listed. 
Then the appropriate federal statute is specified. Facts of 
the investigation are recorded. Finally, the decision as to 
whether or not a violation has occurred is given. All after 
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this is done after the investigation is completed. The LOF 
also includes any corrective actions needed for compliance 
with the appropriate statutes. OCR is responsible for 
monitoring all of the corrective action plans that are 
negotiated with the individual school districts. 
The OCR fiscal year runs from October 1 through Septem­
ber 30. All of the statistics in. this section are reported 
by fiscal year (FY). The total number of complaints the OCR 
has received over the five year period from October 1, 1989 
through September 30, 1993, has increased 83% from 2,780 
complaints received in FY 1989 to 5,090 complaints received 
in FY 1993.^'" For FY 1993, as can be seen in Table 2, 
below, discrimination because of a disability is the largest 
category listed with 2,088 complaints, which was 59% of the 
total number of complaints, followed by race/national origin 
(1,291 - 27%), sex (715 - 15%), age (245 - 5%), and other 
(313 - 17a). The percents add up to more than 100% because a 
complaint can cite more than one basis. Table 3 shows the 
major areas of complaints with service and employment ac­
counting for 96% of the total complaints. 
ISHT L J  J  - . 1  Ibid., 11. 
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Table 2 
Number and Percent of FY 1993 Complaint Receipts 
Citing Each Basis 
Basis Number Percent 
Disability 2,088 59% 
Race/N.O. 1,291 27% 
Sex 715 15% 
Age 245 5% 
Other 313 7% 
NOTE: Percents total more than 100 because complaints can 
cite more than one basis. 
Source: U. S. Department of Education, Office of Civil 
Rights, Fiscal Year 1993—Year-End Management Report--March 
1994 prepared by Planning, Analysis and Systems Service, 
Planning and Analysis Division, Reports and Analysis Branch, 
([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Civil Rights, 1994), Table 3, 
Table 3 
Receipts by Service and Employment Issues 
FY 1993 
Issue Type Number Percent 
of of 
Receipts Receipts 
Service 3,884 82% 
Employment 643 14% 
Both 79 2% 
Other 151 3% 
Total 5,090 100% 
Source: U. S. Department of Education, Office of Civil 
Rights, Fiscal Year 1993—Year-End Management Report--March 
1994 prepared by Planning, Analysis and Systems Service, 
Planning and Analysis Division, Reports and Analysis Branch, 
([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Civil Rights, 1994), Table 4. 
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The OCR receives thousands of complaints every year. 
Not all of these complaints deal with students; some are 
lodged by employees. Also, any institution that receives 
federal funding can be the target of a complaint. The 
statistics in Table 4 only deal with elementary and second­
ary institutions. 
It is informative to look at the top five reasons for 
complaints made to the OCB over the past five fiscal years. 
The five most commonly cited types of discrimination are 
shown in Table 4 with a graphic depiction in Figure 1. The 
top three categories in each of the five years centered on 
disabled students and were service related. In two of the 
five years grievance procedures and due process ranked in 
the top five reasons cited. 
All five of the most commonly cited reasons for FY 1993 
deal with disabled students and are 58% of the total 3,310 
complaints received. Program accessibility for disabled 
students ranked first with 471 citations for 14% of the 
total. Evaluation/classification of disabled students 
ranked second with 419 citations for 13% of the total 3,310 
complaints. In third place was placement/referral of dis­
abled students totaling 389 complaints or 12%. 
Aids/services for disabled students ranked a close fourth 
with 338 citations for 10% with IEP services in fifth place 
with 302 complaints at 9%. 
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Table 4 
Issues Most Commonly Cited in 
Elementary & Secondary Complaint Receipts 
FY 1989 through FY 1993 
Rank Issue/ Year Citation Complaints 
n N % 
FY 1989 
1 Placement/Referral of Disabled Students 377 1,801 21% 
2 Evaluation/Classification of Disabled Students 290 1,801 16% 
3 Disabled Students in Education Settings 264 1,801 15% 
4 Aids/Services for Disabled Students 250 1,801 14% 
5 Grievance Procedures/Due Process 164 1,801 9% 
FY 1990 
1 Placement/Referral of Disabled Students 500 2,247 22% 
2 Evaluation/Classification of Disabled Students 420 2,247 19% 
3 Disabled Students in Education Settings 385 2,247 17% 
4 Aids/Services for Disabled Students 335 2,247 15% 
6 Individualized Education Plan Services 253 2,247 11% 
FY 1991 
1 Placement/Referral of Disabled Students 377 2,454 15% 
2 Evaluation/Classification of Disabled Students 330 2,454 13% 
3 Disabled Students in Education Settings 253 2,454 10% 
4 Aids/Services for Disabled Students 308 2,454 13% 
5 Grievance Procedures/Due Process 279 2,454 11% 
FY 1992 
1 Placement/Referral of Disabled Students 435 2,934 15% 
2 Evaluation/Classification of Disabled Students 378 2,934 13% 
3 Disabled Students in Education Settings 270 2,934 9% 
4 Aids/Services for Disabled Students 308 2,934 10% 
7 Program Accessibility for Disabled Students 340 2,934 12% 
FY 1993 
1 Placement/Referral of Disabled Students 389 3,310 12% 
2 Evaluation/Classification of Disabled Students 419 3,310 13% 
4 Aids/Services for Disabled Students 338 3,310 10% 
6 Individualized Education Plan Services 302 3,310 9% 
7 Program Accessibility for Disabled Students 471 3,310 14% 
Source: U. S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Fiscal 
Year 1993—Year-End Management Report—March 1994 prepared by Planning, 
Analysis and Systems Service, Planning and Analysis Division, Reports and 
Analysis Branch, ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Education, Office 
of Civil Rights, 1994), Table 5, pg. 13. 
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Figure 1- Graphs of Table 4 
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142 
Of all the complaints received by the OCR in FY 1993, 
4,480 were resolved with only 610 pending. The results on 
complaint closure with the actions taken are shown in Table 
5 with a graphic representation in Figure 2. This table 
covers the last five fiscal years. 
Some of the complaints received by OCR do not meet 
basic requirements such as completeness, jurisdiction, 
and timeliness and are closed as no jurisdiction or 
other administrative closure. Others are successfully 
mediated and/or are withdrawn hy the complainant; the 
rest proceed to investigation. 
Four types of closure are listed on the table as well 
as the percentage of corrective actions taken. Correction 
rate is the sum of the numbers in the "administrative" 
column and the "corrective action" column. This rate has 
exceeded 50% for all five fiscal years with a high of 60% 
during FY 1990. Administrative closures have passed correc­
tive action closure in FY 1992 and FY 1993. 
"No jurisdiction" has remained relatively constant 
around the 18% figure over the five year period. While "No 
corrective action required" has fluctuated from 28% in FY 
1989 to 21% in FY 1993. The total number of complaints 
closed has increased in proportion to the total number of 
complaints received. 
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U. S. Department of Education, Office of Civil 
Rights, Fiscal Year 1993--Yeai—End Management Reports-March 
1994 prepared by Planning, Analysis and Systems Service, 
Planning and Analysis Division, Reports and Analysis Branch, 
([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. Department of Education, Office of 
Civil Rights, 1994), 28. 
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Table 5 
Complaint Closures by Closure Type 
and Corrective Action (CA) Rate 
FY 1989 through FY 1993 
Substantive Closures 
Fiscal 
Year 
No CA 
Req' d 
CA 
Req'd 
No 
Juris­
diction 
Admin. Total 
CA 
Rate 
FY 1989 N 714 811 474 558 2,557 53% 
% 28% 32% 19% 22% 100% 
FY 1990 N 744 1,103 501 822 3,170 60% 
% 23% 35% 16% 26% 100% 
FY 1991 N 814 1,124 620 936 3,494 58% 
% 23% 32% 18% 27% 100% 
FY 1992 N 875 1,154 842 1,301 4,172 57% 
% 21% 28% 20% 31% 100% 
FY 1993 N 948 1,149 770 1,613 4,480 5 5% 
% 21% 26% 17% 36% 100% 
Source: (J. S. Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, Fiscal Year 1993--Year-
End Management. Report--March 1994 prepared by Planning, Analysis and Systems Service, 
Planning and Analysis Division, Reports and Analysis Branch, ([Washington, D.C.]: U.S. 
Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights, 1994), Table 14, pg 29. 
Figure 2 
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A sample of the types of complaints that were being 
received by the OCR was reviewed to help predict future 
trends in educational case law. During FY 1993, the average 
number of complaints received each month was in excess of 
400, suggesting the need to use a sample. 
A review of this matter with a long-time employee of 
the OCR revealed that the type of complaints usually clus­
tered into specific categories with very little variance. 
For this reason, one month (February, 1993) was chosen to 
review as a representative group of the whole. The OCR sent 
the researcher all letters of findings (LOF) issued during 
that month related to handicapped issues. 
During February, 1993, 16 LOF's were issued. All of 
the investigations involved public systems. Fifteen com­
plaints had been filed by parents of disabled students. The 
other complaint was filed by a disabled employee. Of the 16 
total LOF's, 14 cited numerous violations against the school 
systems. These violations varied from failure to implement 
a self-evaluation of the school system in regard to the ADA 
to failure to provide a free appropriate public education 
for a disabled student. Two of the LOF's found absolutely 
no evidence of the alleged violations by the school dis­
tricts; both complaints were unfounded. 
Of the 14 school districts that were out of compliance 
with federal statutes, 12 had already initiated corrective 
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actions. The other two school systems were in the process 
of planning extensive renovations to remove architectural 
barriers and make the building accessible to the 
handicapped. 
Of the 16 LOF's, the most common reason cited (n = 10) 
was violation of due process rights in one form or the 
other. The other 6 LOF's were evenly divided among three 
categories - § 504 architectural barriers, disciplinary 
policy, and racial discrimination. Since each LOF had 
several different violations, there is another pattern 
forming. Seven of the cases dealt with suspension of dis­
abled students without proper due process or change of 
placement. Apparently, Honig has made it to the local 
level. Seven cases dealt with improper implementation of 
IEP's. Six cases dealt with inappropriate placement and 
failure to provide a free appropriate public education. 
Summary 
Decisions in the area of special education program 
inclusion or exclusion based solely on disabilities are 
fairly consistent at the appellate court level. The federal 
district courts are another matter altogether. Their deci­
sions may vary on similar issues. Discrepancies seem to 
depend on which cases are cited as antecedents. 
The United States Supreme Court has yet (1994) to hear 
a case involving a child with AIDS or ARC. As a result, 
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these cases have been litigated numerous times because there 
are no precedents to use as guidelines. 
One significant element in all cases is the court's 
determination to protect the due process rights of the 
parents of disabled children and of the children themselves. 
The quickest way for a school district to lose a case is to 
violate due process regulations significantly. The fact 
that due process rights of parents or disabled students were 
violated has been sufficient cause for courts to rule that 
the school system had failed to provide a free appropriate 
public education. Minimally, parents must be advised of 
their rights and be given, in writing, "due process" proce­
dures and regulations. All parent requests for hearings 
should be taken seriously and acted on promptly. 
School officials must be aware of several factors 
playing important roles in recent case law. It is not 
enough for a child to be identified and served in a special 
education program. The student must receive benefits from 
the services provided for the placement to be appropriate. 
If an IEP is ruled inappropriate, the educational placement 
will also be considered inappropriate. If parents aren't 
completely involved in IEP development, their rights have 
been violated. The courts will rule in favor of the school 
systems the majority of the time if due process procedures 
are followed correctly and the IDEA regulations are applied 
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appropriately. The courts steadfastly refused to rule on 
the appropriateness of one educational technique or method 
over another. They leave the methods strictly up to the 
educational professionals. 
Educational professionals should be encouraged by the 
apparent trend among federal judges to consider each case 
individually and employ common sense as well as case law in 
their findings. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Summary 
Historically speaking, children with disabilities have 
been considered second-class citizens and generally excluded 
from American public schools prior to the 1960s. With the 
advent of the national civil rights movement and resulting 
federal legislation, this practice has changed significant­
ly. The rights of disabled students to a free appropriate 
public education (FAPE) have been supported by the court. 
These children must now be given the same opportunities and 
access to public education as non-handicapped children. 
In reviewing the history of these changing rights and 
entitlements, a FAPE in the least restrictive environment 
(LRE) for each disabled child is now mandated federally. 
School officials have tried to accommodate disabled children 
by appropriate educational program inclusion. This resulted 
in a "dual system" of education between regular education 
and special education. Further problems arose with the 
federal mandate to educate disabled children in the LRE. 
As viewpoints and attitudes change, litigation becomes 
more frequent. Federal and state courts are diligently 
trying to clarify these constitutional issues with recent 
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decisions. Until there is sufficient case law to define and 
illustrate congressional gray areas, confusion and litiga­
tion will continue in these areas. 
Answers to the Research Questions 
In Chapter I, five research questions were posed for 
this study to answer. The following answers emerge from a 
review of selected current literature on the educational 
program exclusion or inclusion solely based on a disability, 
the analysis of federal statutes, and the analysis of relev­
ant federal and state case law. 
Question One: What is revealed in current literature 
regarding the legal rights of exceptional children and 
children with disabilities in public education? 
It is generally held that parents of disabled children 
have spearheaded the movement for educational changes by 
organizing and lobbying for inclusive legislation. They 
have accomplished much in the years since Brown (1954). 
There seem to be two divergent views in most of the 
literature: one advocates the right of handicapped children, 
and the other advocates the rights of school systems and 
nonhandicapped children. These should not be conflicting 
views. Most authors agreed with the principle that every 
child is entitled to a FAPE in the LRE. There was resent­
ment about these changes being such unyielding regulations. 
After a review of the historical aspects of inclusion of 
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children with disabilities in public education, it was clear 
that specific legislation was necessary. Schools did not 
include children with disabilities until inclusion was 
mandated by law. Even after federal mandates, schools 
continued to exclude these students from the mainstream by 
putting them in self-contained special education classes. 
Some advocates of disabled children's rights are ada­
mant about total inclusion or mainstreaming of all disabled 
children. The genei^al viewpoint in current literature, 
however, defends mainstreaming, but only to the extent 
appropriate for an individual child. This view leads to 
another assertion that is surfacing in the literature. 
Because every child is an unique individual, the IDEA regu­
lations should be applied on an individual basis. School 
systems should refrain from making blanket determinations 
based on a particular label or classification. This premise 
is strongly supported by the courts. 
Another issue in the literature concerns the rights of 
the "normal" students who comprise the bulk of the student 
population. Who is their advocate? Who is ensuring that 
their rights are protected? 
The final issue that is most prevalent in literature 
reviewed for this study are the effects of both the Individ­
uals with Disabilities Act of 1990 (IDEA) and the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) on educational case law. 
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Some educators believe that these federal Acts will geomet­
rically increase the already myriad paperwork and personnel 
necessary to administer federal regulations, to say nothing 
of the time or the cost involved. 
Question Two: What is the status of educational pro­
gram inclusion or exclusion based solely upon a disability 
as outlined in federal statutes? 
Federal statutes are specific in regard to program 
inclusion or exclusion based solely on a disability. First, 
according to federal statutes, all children with disabili­
ties are entitled to a "free appropriate public education." 
Recent statutes involving educational program inclusion or 
exclusion include the IDEA. The IDEA is the "exclusive 
avenue" available to children with disabilities if there is 
a legal question regarding a free appropriate public educa­
tion (FAPE), IEP or placement. The ADA or the Rehabilita­
tion Act of 1973 are statutes that apply if there is exclu­
sion from a federal funded program caused by an architec­
tural barrier, i.e., no ramp or handicapped restrooms, 
inaccessible playgrounds. 
Problems arise from what Congress did not say in the 
statutes more than from what it did say. The courts are 
having to clarify numerous definitions as well as probable 
intent. The U.S. Supreme Court defined "free appropriate 
public education" in Rowley. In Smith, the Court held that 
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Congress intended the EHA to be the "exclusive avenue" 
through which legal actions are taken to insure a FAPE and 
all that implies. In Tatro, the Court clarified the defini­
tion of "related services," found in the EHA. Burlington 
and Carter deal with reimbursement under EHA of educational 
expenses incurred by parents. Honig, the Court clarified 
the "stay-put" provision of EHA. 
To receive funding under IDEA, a state must have enact­
ed similar or parallel statutes. As of 1993, 45 states 
have statutes with parallel or exact wording to IDEA or the 
court has ruled that the statutes do not exceed the federal 
statutes. However, five states (Kansas, Maryland, Massachu­
setts, Michigan, Missouri) still have statutes using lan­
guage that exceeds the federal requirements for a "free 
appropriate public education." 
Questions three and four can be answered together 
because both involve the analysis of cases dealing with 
program exclusion or inclusion because of a disability. What 
is the status of cases involving children with disabilities? 
What discernible patterns and trends can be identified in 
judicial decisions? 
Sixty-seven cases, ruled on by state or federal courts 
since 1978, were read and analyzed for this study (See Table 
6). The courts ultimately ruled in favor of the handicapped 
student in 35 of these cases and in favor of the schools in 
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30 of the cases. Two of the cases were split decisions. It 
was rare that there was only one issue for the court to rule 
on because of the complexity of these cases. The exception 
to this practice was when parents of disabled students 
failed to exhaust administrative remedies set forth in IDEA. 
The courts summarily ruled in favor of the schools in nine 
cases because the parents failed to follow due process. 
Three cases were decided in favor of the disabled students 
because the schools failed to follow due process procedures. 
Failure of school districts to provide FAPE was the 
reason cited by courts ruling in favor of the students in 12 
cases. In nine cases, the schools won because they had 
provided FAPE for the students with disabilities. 
Mainstreaming of students was the principal issue in 
nine cases. Students won six cases and school districts won 
three cases. Development and implementation of an appropri­
ate IEP was the primary issue in ten cases with the schools 
prevailing in five cases, students in one case and one split 
decision. The main concern of appropriate placement was 
evenly split between students and school systems in six 
cases. In four cases involving § 504 exclusion, three were 
won by handicapped students. The last area of dispute was 
the "stay-put" provision with the courts ruling for the 
students in all four cases. 
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Table 6 - Analysis of Judicial Decisions 
Primary Reason for 
Judicial Decision 
In Favor 
of Stu­
dent 
In Favor 
of 
School 
Split 
Decision 
Total 
Cases 
Parents Failed to 
Follow Due Process 
0 9 0 9 
School Failed to 
follow Due Process 
3 0 0 3 
Was a FAPE Provid­
ed for the Student 
12 
Not Pro­
vided 
9 
Provided 
1 22 
Failure to Main­
stream Student 
Appropriately 
6 3 0 9 
Development & 
Implementation of 
the IEP 
4 5 1 10 
Appropriate 
Placement 
3 3 0 6 
§ 504 Exclusion 3 1 0 4 
"Stay-Put" 
Provision 
4 0 0 4 
Total Number of 
Cases 
35 30 2 67 
There are discernible patterns and trends apparent in 
the judicial decision of the courts. The courts have ruled 
that following due process procedures is of paramount impor­
tance for both the parents of handicapped students and the 
school district. The next important principle based on 
court decision is the development of an appropriate IEP with 
full parental participation. If the court concludes that 
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the IEP is inappropriate, the educational placement is 
usually inappropriate also. The courts have ruled that just 
providing services to handicapped students isn't enough. 
The student must benefit educationally from the services 
provided or the educational placement is inappropriate. 
Question Five: What legal guidelines can be set forth 
as a result of this research to aid administrators and 
school board members? The legal guidelines which have 
developed from this study are presented later on in this 
chapter. 
Conclusions 
Making definite conclusions is difficult at best when 
dealing with legal research. No two cases are identical 
because each case has a different set of circumstances and 
deals with different disabilities. However, based on the 
cases analyzed in this study, there are some areas in com­
mon. Therefore, the following general conclusions 
concerning educational program inclusion or exclusion solely 
based on a disability can be made: 
(1) Parents must be given a copy of the due process 
procedures and policies at least once. Their 
rights should then be explained in detail. If a 
dispute occurs between the parents and school 
officials, explain the due process again. Failure 
of the school officials to meet due process re­
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quirements are adequate grounds by themselves for 
finding that a free appropriate public education 
has not been provided. 
The Individual Education Program (IEP) must be 
developed with all of the appropriate professional 
involved in addition to full parental participa­
tion. 
Inappropriate IEP development or implementation 
can cause an educational placement to be ruled 
inappropriate also. Therefore, a FAPE has not 
been provided. 
Even though a student is receiving services ac­
cording to an IEP, the student must receive some 
educational benefit from the services provided by 
the IEP. Otherwise, The IEP is inappropriate and 
a school system can be charged with failure to 
provide a FAPE. 
Courts rule in favor of parents if a school dis­
trict fails to mainstream or appropriately main­
stream a disabled child (the LRE provision.) 
Failure of the schools to place a child with dis­
abilities in an appropriate program will cause the 
court to rule in favor of parents. 
Parents must exhaust all administrative remedies 
before legal action can be taken. Legal actions 
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brought by parents have been dismissed or found in 
favor of the school district because the parents 
have failed to exhaust administrative remedies 
(8) Courts also have ruled that legal actions must be 
brought within the time allowed by IDEA. 
(9) The IDEA is the exclusive avenue through which a 
legal action regarding the FAPE of a handicapped 
child can be brought. 
(10) If the §504 complaint is legitimate, the school 
district usually loses the case. 
(11) If there is any pending due process procedure, a 
student's placement can not be changed. 
(12) Courts have not ruled on different methods of edu­
cation. They leave educational methods to the 
experts. 
Guidelines for School Officials to Use Regarding 
Program Inclusion or Exclusion Based Solely 
on Disabilities 
The following guidelines should help school officials 
in dealing with special education program inclusion or 
exclusion decisions. These guidelines will not guarantee 
trouble-free, legally defensible special educational deci­
sion and placements in all cases, but they will help public 
school administrators strive for this goal. 
(1) Violation of due process procedures will put a 
school system in jeopardy legally and financially. 
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(2) Parents can't be given the due process rights too 
many times. 
(3) If parents bring suit and haven't exhausted the 
administrative remedies, they will probably lose. 
(4) If a dispute arises with a parent, explain the due 
process procedures again, orally and in writing. 
(5) The IEP must be appropriate for an educational 
placement to be appropriate. 
(6) The IEP must be implemented properly and in a 
timely fashion. 
(7) Appropriate mainstreaming should be implemented in 
accordance with least restrictive environment 
provision when it is appropriate. 
(8) Correctly place students in educational programs. 
(9) Do not make any changes in educational placement 
without following due process procedures. 
(10) Do not suspend an exceptional student for an in­
definite period of time. Specify the exact amount 
of time for the suspension up to ten days. For a 
suspension of more than 10 days, a school-base 
committee meeting is required for a change in 
placement. 
159 
Recommendations for Further Study 
Federal statutes regarding educational program exclu­
sion or inclusion solely based on a disability have been in 
place since 1990. The courts have slowly clarified gray 
areas in these statutes with pertinent rulings. The Supreme 
Court has not heard any cases involving students with AIDS 
or ARC. This issue warrants further study in the near 
future. 
With the recent change in the United States Congress 
after the elections in November, 1994, and the fact that 
IDEA must be re-authorized during the 104th Congress (proba­
bly in 1995), advocates of children with disabilities are 
extremely concerned with what types of changes will be made 
in IDEA. Assumptions about what the Republican Congress 
will do include making IDEA an unfunded mandate thus making 
enforcement very difficult or repealing the majority of the 
law and giving legal control back to the individual states. 
If any of these suppositions become law, the impact on 
educational case law will be substantial. 
The evolution of the rights of children with disabili­
ties is constantly in flux as a result of up-to-date U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. For this reason and the scheduled 
re-authorization of IDEA, this study should be updated in 
the next two to four years. Total inclusion of children 
with disabilities in regular education as opposed to segre­
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gated classes with mainstreaming only for non-academic 
subjects is occurring more frequently. The current trend in 
court decisions revolves around least restrictive environ­
ment and the interpretation of "where appropriate" in IDEA. 
The Supreme Court should address this issue soon. Total 
inclusion deserves closer scrutiny in the near future. 
Another area currently being litigated in the courts is 
that of awarding reimbursement of educational expenses for 
students in private school settings. If these decision 
continue to favor the parents, they will have major reper­
cussions on the educational community. The Supreme Court 
will need to clarify this issue. 
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